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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the late 1980s, competition law has become a truly global regulatory enterprise. More 
than 130 jurisdictions around the world now have competition (or antitrust) systems in place.
1
 
Many of these, to prevent firms from distorting competition, stand upon three main 
substantive pillars: 
(i) provisions prohibiting restrictive agreements (in the US and EU, Section One of the 
Sherman Act 1890
2
 and Article 101
3
 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (“TFEU”) respectively);  
(ii) provisions prohibiting monopolization (or attempts to monopolize) or abusive conduct 
of dominant firms (Section Two Sherman Act and Article 102 TFEU );
 4
 and  
(iii) provisions prohibiting mergers that will substantially lessen or significantly impede 
competition (section 7 of the Clayton Act 1914 and the EU Merger Regulation, 
Council Regulation 139/2004).
5
  
In many countries, the purpose of antitrust legislation, and its core concepts, is not precisely 
defined.
6
 For example, legislation in the EU and the US does not make its purpose explicit or 
provide definitions of its central substantive terms, such as, respectively, “restraint of trade”, 
“monopolization”, “substantial lessening of competition” and “restriction” of competition, 
“abuse”, “dominant position” and “significant impediment to effective competition”. Rather, 
the task of putting flesh on these laws’ skeletal provisions has been left to be developed in the 
jurisprudence and to be decided, ultimately, by the Supreme Court (in the US) and the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (in the EU, comprised of the Court of Justice (CJ) and the 
General Court (GC)).
7
 Over the years, therefore, these courts have had to wrestle with the 
plethora of complex questions and issues that application of the laws has raised. These 
include what their goals are and how the overarching objectives guide interpretation of their 
key words and the crafting of tests to anticompetitive or restrictive conduct and to distinguish 
                                                 
1
  William E. Kovacic & Marianela Lopez-Galdos, Lifecycles of Competition Systems: Explaining Variation 
in the Implementation of New Regimes, 79 Law & Contemp. Probs. 101, 101-02 (2016). In contrast, “Until 
the mid 20th century less than 10 competition regimes existed worldwide” (UNCTAD) 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/CompetitionLaw/ResearchPartnership/Benchmarking-Competition.aspx. 
2
  Section One provides that “[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
3
  Art 101(1) prohibits agreements between undertakings which affect trade between Member States and have 
as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. Art 101(3) provides a legal 
exception from the Art 101(1) prohibition for agreements which satisfy its four conditions, see eg, Alison 
Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU COMPETITION LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS (OUP, 6
th
 edn, 2016), 
Chaps 3 and 4.  
4
  Section Two, 15 U.S.C. § 2, prohibits any person from monopolizing or attempting to monopolize trade, 
whilst Article 102 prohibits abuse of a dominant position held by one or more undertakings.  
5
  Clayton Act, section 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18, prohibits merger transactions which will substantially lessen 
competition whilst the EU Merger Regulation, [2004] OJ L 24/1, provides for concentrations which would 
significantly impede effective competition in the EU, or a substantial part of it, to be declared incompatible 
with the common market. 
6
  On the modern debate about antitrust’s goals, see Symposium, The Goals of Antitrust, 81 Ford. L. Rev. 2151 
(2013). 
7
  Treaty on European Union, Art 19. 
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it from procompetitive or competitively neutral conduct (or, to paraphrase Justice Stephen 
Breyer, to separate the antitrust goats from the beneficial sheep).
8
  
Commentary in both jurisdictions has repeatedly debated whether, and when, it is more 
efficient to use “rules” or “standards” to determine the legality of conduct subject to the 
antitrust laws and how such rules or standards should be formulated.
9
 An extensive literature 
has identified the tensions between the desire for the competition law to be accurate and 
consistent, yet also clear, predictable, transparent, administrable and not too costly to apply; 
the question of when complex standards may be more appropriate than simpler, bright line 
rules (or vice versa) is well rehearsed.
10
  
The difference between rules and standards is a matter of degree and the line between them 
can be fine. Some rules begin to resemble standards when, for the sake of accuracy, they 
require consideration of additional circumstances. By the same measure, a standard may 
incorporate decision-making principles that seek to attain some of the clarity associated with 
rules.
11
 The blurring of the lines between rules and standards has led to debate, in the antitrust 
context, as to whether doctrine governing firm behaviour should present a sharp dichotomy 
with two wholly distinct realms – one compartment in which some conduct is prohibited (or 
approved) categorically, and a separate compartment in which conduct is subject to a more 
elaborate examination of purpose and actual or likely effects – or whether there should be a 
                                                 
8
  Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 914 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
9
  We use the terms “standard” and “rule” in the manner set out in Ehrlich’s and Posner’s formative paper on 
the design of legal rules, Issac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 
J. Legal Stud. 257 (1974). The term “standard” refers to “a general criterion of social choice,” such as a 
mandate to promote “competition.” The term “rule” refers to a more precise statement that circumscribes the 
assessment of factors relevant to a decision according to the standard. Id. at 258. The relative efficacy of 
rules and standards is an issue of virtually universal concern in the field of law. See, e.g., Sepehr 
Shahshahani, The Nirvana Fallacy in Fair Use Reform, 18 Minn. J. L., Sci. & Tech 273., 283 & n. 59 (2015) 
(collecting sources); Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev. 49, 52-54 & n. 11 (2007) (hereinafter Rules Versus Standards) (collecting sources); Louis Kaplow, A 
Model of Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J. L. Econ & Org. 150 (1995). 
10
  See further Section 2 below. Informative treatments of this topic in antitrust law include Crane, Rules Versus 
Standards, note 9; Wolfgang Kerber, ‘Rules vs Standards’ or Standards as Delegation of Authority for 
Making (Optimally Differentiated) Rules, in INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
489 (Thomas Eger et al. eds., Springer, 2008); Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and 
Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 So. Cal. L. Rev. 733 (2012); Yannis 
Katsuulakos & D. Ulph, On optimal legal standards for competition policy: A general welfare-based 
analysis, 57 J. Indus. Econ. 410 (2009): Symposium: The Future Course of the Rule of Reason, 68 Antitrust 
L.J. 331 (2000); Leon B. Greenfield & Daniel J. Mathieson, Rules Versus Standards and the Antitrust 
Jurisprudence of Justice Breyer, Antitrust, Summer 2009, at 87 (reviewing rules versus standards debate in 
context of analyzing opinions of a jurist who has focused on tradeoffs between the two approaches to 
formulating legal commands). For a discussion of the issue as it arises in the treatment of vertical restraints, 
see OECD Policy Roundtables: Resale Price Maintenance (2008), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/43835526.pdf and Matthew Bennett et al., Resale Price Maintenance: 
Explaining the Controversy, and Small Steps Towards a More Nuanced Policy (2011) 33 Fordham 
International Law Journal 1278, 1281-1282 (conducting a detailed assessment in every case might impose 
too high a burden on firms, competition agencies (and other claimants) and courts). A separate literature 
discusses analytical approaches that enforcement agencies can sequence the collection and assessment of 
information needed to apply a legal regime that subjects some conduct to assessment by bright-line rules and 
reviews other behavior with standards., See Damien J. Neven, Identifying “Restrictions of Competition” – 
Some Comments from a Law and Economics Perspective, in The Notion of Restriction of Competition 39 
(Damien Gerard et al. eds., 2017) 
11
  See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577 (1988).  
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continuum of tests – a mix of rules, standards, and hybrid approaches in between. In 
particular, whether and when there should be: 
 categorical rules that condemn certain conduct (for example, the US rule of per se 
illegality);  
 categorical rules that allow certain conduct (rules of per se legality);  
 standards that test conduct with a more complex, multi-faceted analysis of the 
restrictive and procompetitive effects of each agreement, accounting for the context in 
which the behaviour took place and the situation that would occur without the 
agreement; and/or  
 intermediate types of analysis developed, such as a rule which requires the weighing 
or balancing of certain factors before it is applied, the application of rebuttable 
presumptions of legality or illegality, or a structured standard which requires a series 
of specified factors to be taken into account.  
Where courts, as they have in the US, conclude that antitrust chiefly seeks to promote 
economic efficiency (allocative, productive, and dynamic), economics will guide the answer 
to these questions. Here a central focus of analysis is to assess how likely it is that the 
conduct at issue will permit the relevant firm(s) to exercise market power
12
 and interfere with 
the competitive process, and deny consumers the products and/or services which offer the 
best value for money.  
A legal system cannot always completely reflect the principles underpinning it. In practice, 
there rarely is a perfect fit between a chosen legal rule and the conduct to be controlled. 
Antitrust rules almost inevitably suffer, in varying degrees, from one of two flaws. Some are 
overinclusive in the sense that they condemn conduct that sometimes is competitively benign 
or beneficial – referred to by economists as Type I error. Other rules are underinclusive in the 
sense that they sometimes tolerate conduct that in fact is competitively destructive – referred 
to by economists as Type II error. The presence of Type I or Type II errors creates incentives 
that affect the behaviour of firms, courts, and competition agency decision makers.
13
 For 
example, an overinclusive rule of illegality may not only deter firms from engaging in 
procompetitive arrangements but may also result in harmful distortions in the law if decision-
takers do not fully support the rule and seek  ways to avoid its application.
14
 In deciding on 
the correct approach, an antitrust regime must therefore consider how to minimise risks of 
Type I and Type II errors.  
In this paper we concentrate principally on the question of how this debate affects the 
analytical framework for identifying infringing agreements in the US and EU. Although the 
principles discussed in this paper are relevant to all three substantive pillars of antitrust, 
voluminous debates in recent commentary have focused on how to construct a test, or tests, to 
identify unlawful abusive or exclusionary behaviour and to distinguish it from competition on 
the merits; and what tools or methods can be used to identify mergers which are liable to 
                                                 
12
  Market power is the ability to maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time or to 
maintain output in terms of product quantities, product quality and variety or innovation below competitive 
levels for a significant period of time and/or achieve offsetting efficiencies, Andrew I. Gavil et al., 
ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY (Thomsen 
West, 3d ed., 2017), at 18, 28-30. 
13
  On the assessment of error costs in formulating and applying liability rules antitrust cases, see Jonathan B. 
Baker, Taking the Error Out of Error Costs: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 Antitrust L.J. 1 (2015).  
14
  See e.g., notes 94-100 and text. 
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harm consumer welfare. In our view, despite useful recent scholarship that proposes 
analytical improvements, the question of how agreements are to be analysed under both the 
US and the EU jurisprudence is also unduly opaque; it is frequently difficult to ascertain 
whether agreements, including joint venture and other horizontal collaboration and 
distribution agreements, are compatible with the law. In particular, confusion about the role 
and scope of per se rules, the role and scope of ancillary restraint doctrines, and how 
competing anti- and procompetitive effects of mixed agreements are to be balanced against 
each other have led to excessive complexity in the system. Given the necessity for firms to be 
able to assess the antitrust risk involved in concluding their day-to-day commercial 
agreements this remains a matter of acute importance.  
This paper commences in section 2 by considering what factors might shape development of 
a coherent and optimal framework for antitrust analysis in a jurisdiction. Once these factors 
have been set out, sections 3 and 4 examine respectively how US and EU competition law 
have approached the issues identified in relation to the analysis of agreements and what 
features of each system have moulded the developments there. Section 5 concludes that both 
systems require some development to create more intelligible frameworks for antitrust 
analysis of agreements based on common concepts rather than historical categories of 
antitrust analysis. Competition agencies could play an important part as catalysts in this 
progress. Indeed, one problem in particular, has been that because in more recent years 
European Commission (Commission) enforcement under Article 101 has focused most 
closely on cartels a majority of cases arising before the EU Courts relate to issues arising in 
cartel cases many of which do not involve matters involving the substantive tests used to 
identify infringements. The paucity of cases on this latter issue imparts a staccato quality to 
the development of doctrine, as it denies courts the opportunity to refine analytical principles 
incrementally. Greater enforcement of complex cases by the Commission seems necessary to 
ensure that cases are brought before the courts which enable the desired evolution to occur. 
Before proceeding, we address one point of terminology. The Commission describes the 
enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 as “antitrust” and distinguishes it from merger 
enforcement. In the United States, the term “antitrust” encompasses both merger and non-
merger enforcement. In this Article we speak of antitrust in the broader US manner as 
encompassing all areas of competition law, including the prohibition of certain forms of 
agreements.  
2. DEVELOPING A COHERENT FRAMEWORK: THE DESIGN OF LEGAL COMMANDS 
As noted above, Section One and Article 101 articulate general commands which require 
further specification to be implemented in practice. In this section, we examine the 
considerations that the EU and US antitrust regimes, as well as other competition law 
systems, must account for in determining how to apply these broad mandates. 
A. Identifying Objectives 
The development of implementing tests first must examine the law’s objectives. Systems 
vary in how lawmakers communicate these aims. Sometimes the statute’s text sets out the 
goals. In other regimes, the law’s aims appear in legislative history, including reports of 
legislative committees or floor debates that precede enactment. The complexity of the 
implementing rules depends heavily on the nature of the goals to be achieved. A “purist” 
efficiency-oriented antitrust regime provides a relatively simpler (though hardly simple) task 
for rule formulation than a system that seeks to attain multi-faceted goals. Ideally, a 
legislature that establishes a multi-goal regime will identify a hierarchy of aims, assign 
weights to each goal, and indicate how to resolve conflicts among them. Whatever goal 
structure is chosen, the competition system’s analytical concepts should be common for all 
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three pillars of antitrust – agreements/ dominant firm conduct/ mergers (dealing with types of 
conduct which may have negative effects on competition).
15
 
B. Rules and Standards: General Considerations 
A sound competition law system seeks to avoid both overreliance on bright line rules (or the 
misuse of categorical analysis) and the indiscriminate acceptance of open-ended, multi-
factored standards to analyse conduct.
16
 As described more fully below, either tendency 
presents hazards. Excessive reliance on bright-line rules (to condemn or to exculpate) can 
sacrifice economic benefits generated by practices which pose some competitive dangers but, 
in important circumstances, serve valuable ends, or render decision-takers powerless to act 
against conduct which has the ability to harm competition. An obsession with applying 
bright-line rules also can tempt enforcement agencies and courts to manipulate the rules – by 
extending or narrowing them rather than focussing needed attention on actual or likely 
competitive effects.
17
 At the same time, bright-line rules can serve important ends 
(particularly, the attainment of procedural economy) when the rules rest upon a sound 
understanding, from theory and experience, that the practice in question typically imposes 
harm (a rule to condemn) or normally has benign or procompetitive effects (a rule to 
exculpate). 
Just as competition law at times has leaned too heavily on bright-line rules, on other 
occasions it too willingly has resorted to open-ended standards to solve recurring analytical 
problems. To some degree, this tendency is understandable. At first glance, a mandate to 
forbid behaviour that endangers competition might seem to demand a broad inquiry into a 
wide range of considerations that bear upon the conduct’s effects. A number of landmark US 
decisions are famous for their recital of myriad factors that should be examined to determine 
the legality of challenged practices.
18
 To posit the apparent inevitability of substantial 
analytical complexity incorrectly suggests that all antitrust inquiries must be time-consuming, 
resource-intensive endeavours, and it obscures possibilities for analytical short-cuts that can 
reach the correct result at lower cost to the parties and courts. The sense that broad 
reasonableness standards invariably, or usually, serve to exonerate defendants can induce an 
exaggerated shift to the use of bright-line rules of prohibition.
19
 
If, as is common in most competition law systems, the legal regime employs a mix of bright-
line rules and standards, the regime will require an initial sorting exercise that places 
                                                 
15
  See Gavil et al., note 12, at v. ix-x; Gavil, note 10, at 735; Carles Esteva Mosso, The Contribution of Merger 
Control to the Definition of Harm to Competition in THE NOTION OF RESTRICTION OF COMPETITION 311 
(Damien Gerard et al., eds., 2017), (GCLC Conference, Brussels, Feb. 1, 2016) available at 
http://www.ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2016_03_en.pdf. 
16
  Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1073 (10
th
 Cir. 2013 (Gorsuch, J.) (“[O]f course, most every 
rule proves over- or under-inclusive in some way.”); MindGames, Inc. v. Western Pub. Co. Inc., 218 F.3d 
652, at 657 (7
th
 Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.) (“No sensible person supposes that rules are always superior to 
standards or vice versa”). 
17
  Mark A. Lemley & Christopher B. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 
1207 (2008). 
18
  Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United 
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
19
  This arguably took place in the United States from the early 1940s through the early 1970s, when the 
Supreme Court expanded the range of conduct subject to per se condemnation. See William E. Kovacic & 
Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. Econ. Perspectives 43, 49-
50 (2000) (describing increased reliance on per se rules to condemn business conduct). 
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observed behaviour into one of two baskets: conduct suitable for summary condemnation (or 
approval), and conduct requiring a more elaborate inquiry. This first step – referred to below 
as “characterization” or “classification” – involves a preliminary assessment of the 
competitive consequences of the behaviour. Antitrust-relevant conduct ordinarily does not 
appear before the enforcement agency or the court with a convenient, easily recognized label 
that unambiguously identifies its character.
20
 The application of a system that employs a mix 
of rules and standards requires a threshold decision, explicit or implicit, that the behaviour 
belongs in one category or the other. It is impossible to make this threshold choice without 
some assessment (perhaps very abbreviated) of whether the conduct has redeeming merit. 
C. A Role for Rules of Illegality? 
In a pivotal early judgment in US antitrust law, the Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. of 
New Jersey v. United States
21
 established the rule of reason as the baseline analytical method 
to applying the Sherman Act’s ban on contracts in “restraint of trade”.22 In so doing it left 
open the possibility that certain behaviours might be so inherently dangerous that they could 
be banned in a summary manner – in what US antitrust law would come to call a per se rule 
of illegality.
23
 Later decisions realized this possibility by denominating various practices for 
which illegality is established simply by proof that two or more parties formed agreements to 
engage in the behaviour.
24
 
Commentators generally agree that summary condemnation is appropriate for conduct 
manifestly anticompetitive and most unlikely to have offsetting benefits. A rule of categorical 
illegality provides the benefit of clarity and procedural economy which is calculated to 
outweigh the cost of some false positives. Many jurisdictions apply a rule of per se illegality, 
or virtual per se illegality, against some horizontal arrangements, such as price fixing. The 
extent to which such a rule should be expanded beyond this, for example to vertical practices, 
single-firm exclusionary behaviour or to new types of conduct arising, is much more 
controversial and contested.  
This category must, however, be confined narrowly and appropriately otherwise it will fall 
into disrepute and decision-takers may seek ways of avoiding its consequences. Means of 
evasion include prioritisation by which a competition agency decides not to bring cases, or by 
manipulating law in other ways to avoid finding an infringement (such as making it more 
difficult for a claimant to bring an action or prove the existence of an agreement
25
 or 
                                                 
20
  On rare occasions, prosecutors will collect evidence that shows the unmistakable awareness of the business 
officials that they are engaged in an illegal collusive scheme. See United States v. Andreas, 216 F.2d 645 (7
th
 
Cir. 2000) (recounting evidence that Justice Department used to prosecute lysine cartel participants). 
21
  221 U.S. 1 (1911).  
22
  Id. at 60 (“[T]he standard of reason . . . was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining 
whether in a given case a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which [Section One 
of the Sherman Act] provided.”).  
23
  See id. at 65 (observing that previous Supreme Court decisions established that the “nature and character” of 
certain contracts create “a conclusive presumption” that such contracts violate the Sherman Act). 
24
  See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (prohibiting all agreements to fix or 
stabilize prices); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (forbidding all 
agreements to allocate customers or geographic markets); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 
365 (1967) (forbidding all agreements by which a manufacturer limited its retailers to specific geographic 
territories). 
25
  For example, the US Courts have: raised requirements that plaintiffs must satisfy to plead the fact of 
concerted action (see discussion of Matsushita Electric Industrial Co v. Zenith Radio Corp 475 US 574 
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modifying or providing exceptions to the rule
26
) which might have broader implications and 
make other antitrust actions harder to bring. 
Another, more principled approach to limitation is to expressly recognize exceptions to a 
general rule of prohibition through a characterization process. As examined more completely 
in Section 3, from the early days of the Sherman Act courts sought to avoid false positives 
associated with summary condemnation of severe horizontal restraints such as price 
restrictions by recognizing the ancillary restraints doctrine, which excused restrictions 
deemed necessary to the success of an efficiency-enhancing collaboration of competitors.
27
 
The process of making exceptions – defining conduct that qualifies for more lenient treatment 
while preserving a zone of practices always forbidden – places a premium on clarity in 
specifying how, in the typical case, a court is to determine whether a practice deserves more 
elaborate examination. At the same time, there may be behaviour which strongly resembles 
conduct subject to categorical prohibition yet also presents possible efficiency justifications. 
In these conditions, the perceived inadequacy of a binary decision making calculus (the 
conduct is always bad, therefore condemn versus the conduct has ambiguous effects, 
therefore undertake an exhaustive, fact-intensive inquiry) led courts to recognize tests that 
employ rebuttable presumptions of illegality – known in the US as a truncated rule of reason 
analysis or a quick look – to assess efficiency claims.28 
D.  A Role for Rules of Legality? 
As an antitrust system denominates certain behaviour as so dangerous to warrant categorical 
disapproval, it also might preclude challenges to conduct that always, or ordinarily, is 
believed to have benign or procompetitive effects.
29
 The logic of per se rules to exculpate is 
essentially the same as the logic of per se rules to condemn. Such rules provide valuable 
clarity to business officials by identifying “safe harbours” in which they can operate without 
attack, and they avoid the expenditure of resources to assess the impact of practices that 
usually improve competition or, at a minimum, do not endanger it. As with a rule of 
categorical prohibition, a rule of per se legality creates error risks, in this case of 
                                                                                                                                                        
(1986) and Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly 550 US 554, 557 (2007) notes 99-100 and text); and demanded 
greater proof to establish the requisite form of illegal agreement in a minimum resale price maintenance 
(“RPM”) case (see discussion of Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp 485 US 717 (1988) 
note 94 and text). 
26
  A major step in the Supreme Court’s erosion of the per se ban against RPM established in Dr. Miles was to 
withdraw maximum RPM from the rule’s coverage (see State Oil v. Khan 522 US 3 (1997) note 98 and 
text). Since the 1930s and 1940s, the Supreme Court has labeled tying arrangements as per se offenses, even 
though a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant has market power in the tying product (a factor which 
is irrelevant in the traditional formulation of the per se offence, see Socony-Vacuum note 24), see Jefferson 
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
27
  United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
28
  NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Polygram Holding, Inc. v. Federal Trade 
Comm’n, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
29
  Compare Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7 (2006) (per se prohibition of internal pricing decisions of a 
legitimate joint venture “would be inconsistent with this Court’s precedents”); James Keyte, “Quick Looks” 
and the Modern Analytical Framework for Assessing Legitimate Competitor Collaborations, Antitrust, 
Summer 2016, at 23, 25-29 (interpreting Dagher and American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 
560 U.S. 183 (2010) as approving use of quick look analysis to uphold core collaboration activities of 
efficiency-enhancing joint ventures and restraints imposed within the scope of the collaboration). 
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underinclusiveness; it ignores instances in which the conduct presumed to be acceptable 
causes actual competitive harm. 
Professor Daniel Crane has offered a separate rationale for using bright-line rules as 
immunizing devices for broad swaths of industrial behaviour while preserving a role for 
standards in determining liability for conduct falling outside of safe harbours.
30
 Clear rules 
provide optimal incentives to engage in beneficial competitive behaviour and reduce 
litigation costs – and to deter unmeritorious antitrust actions/rent seeking behaviour that are 
likely to be threatening when the governing law is presented as standard. In this context 
underinclusive rules are optimal when intervention is believed to pose a high risk of chilling 
efficient conduct. Certain forms of single-firm conduct often are offered as candidates for 
complete immunity on this basis.  
To this point, we have focused on the courts as the mechanisms for determining when rules 
or standards are appropriate methods of analysis. Legislatures and enforcement agencies can 
perform the same function. Singapore’s competition law, for example, excludes vertical 
agreements from the provision dealing with concerted practices.
31
 Such measures, in effect, 
reserve supervision of vertical agreements to the examination of dominant firms and accept 
possible false negatives that arise if non-dominant enterprises employ vertical contractual 
restraints which harm competition. Another approach is for the enforcement agency to issue 
enforcement guidelines or regulations that recognize safe harbours – for example, to exempt 
parties with low market shares which incorporate less offensive restraints within their 
agreements.
32
 These forms of agency policy making ordinarily do not provide an absolute 
rule of legality; the competition agency prospectively can alter its policy and modify or 
withdraw the protection, and the competition agency’s guidelines might not preclude other 
enforcement mechanisms (e.g., private rights of action, lawsuits by other public enforcement 
agencies not subject to the competition agency’s control) from challenging conduct that the 
guidelines would leave untouched. 
E. Devising Workable Standards 
Perhaps the greatest challenge of modern policy regarding agreements is what Phillip Areeda 
called “administrability”.33 For some time there was concern in the US that the rule of reason 
standard articulated in cases such as Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States,
34
 
involved an expensive, indeterminate examination of challenged conduct which, in practice, 
tended to exonerate defendants.
35
 The perception of the rule of reason as unmanageable and, 
                                                 
30
  Crane, Rules Versus Standards, note 9, at 99-100. 
31
  Competition Act, Third Schedule para. 8. See also discussion of EU block exemption regulations in Section 
4. Many jurisdictions have enacted statutes that exempt entire sectors or types of transactions from the 
application of the antitrust laws. For example, protections for collective bargaining agreements are 
commonplace. Daniel J. Gifford, Redefining the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 1379 (1988) 
(discussing the US labor exemption). 
32
  See e.g., discussion of block exemptions and de minimis principle in Section 4. In analyzing vertical issues, 
the US courts have tended to dismiss claims where market shares are relatively low, see note 110 and text.  
33
  Phillip Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the Future, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 959, 
965-70 (1987) (discussing importance of administrability as factor in setting antitrust tests for predatory 
pricing). 
34
  246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
35
  Commentary that has interpreted Chicago Board of Trade in this manner is collected in Gavil, note 10, 733, 
733 & n.3. Defendants in antitrust cases typically press for a broad interpretation of the rule of reason’s 
 
10 
 
as applied, permissive can introduce unfortunate distortions into a competition law system. 
Such was the case in US jurisprudence from the early 1940s through the early 1970s, when 
the Supreme Court, fearing that courts were ‘of limited utility in examining difficult 
economic problems’ and weighing competing economic effects36 dramatically expanded the 
category of agreements deemed to be illegal per se., in many cases with considerable cost to 
efficiency.  
Awareness of the problems associated with seemingly formless standards has inspired an 
extensive modern search for methods to make the traditional rule of reason more workable. 
Commentators and enforcement agencies have made extensive efforts to suggest how a 
reasonableness standard might be structured to minimize the information costs associated 
with the traditional formula and to sort out, at a more preliminary state of the analysis, 
whether the challenged conduct presents serious competitive hazards and whether efficiency 
considerations might justify the behaviour. These structured or truncated forms of analysis 
often rely on presumptions to determine which party bears the burden of coming forward 
with evidence, respectively, about competitive harms and justifications.  
The pursuit of more manageable standards has yielded two noteworthy developments in the 
US. First, the courts have recognized the availability of analytical techniques that stand 
between the poles of absolute prohibition and a “full blown” reasonableness inquiry.37 As a 
related matter, courts have employed a burden-shifting framework to organize the evaluation 
of theories of harm and supporting evidence in agreements, mergers, and monopolization 
cases.
38
 The result has been a detectable movement away from analysis based on the 
classification of conduct into specific categories, and a movement toward a more concept-
based approach, which focuses on three essential concerns: the theory of harm, proof of 
actual or likely adverse effects and assessment of countervailing efficiencies. Despite 
progress on these fronts, difficult conceptual issues remain unresolved. Most notably, there 
remains considerable debate over the test to be applied to restraints deemed to be helpful to 
the realization of efficiencies or other worthy aims. Must the defendants show that such 
restraints are “indispensable” or “necessary” to the attainment of valid ends, or is it sufficient 
that they be “reasonably necessary” for the purpose asserted? Can the plaintiff prevail by 
demonstrating that the defendant could have availed itself of less restrictive measures to 
achieve the claimed efficiencies and/or how can competing harms and benefits be weighed? 
Secondly, the work of courts has been supplemented and, in some instances, influenced by 
the issuance of enforcement agency guidelines, notices, and speeches. Collectively, the use of 
these tools has sought to clarify the policy goals to be achieved, to specify the factors to be 
considered and the weight to be assigned to each, and to suggest the ordering of the analysis, 
                                                                                                                                                        
demands to improved their prospects of success in litigation. See 7 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1511a, at 464 (3d ed. 2010) (“The defendant invokes the rule of reason in order to 
maximize the plaintiff’s burden and its own chances of prevailing on the merits or of outlasting plaintiffs 
lacking the energy, time, or money for a lengthy inquiry into reasonableness.”). 
36
  Topco Assocs., Inc. v United States, 405 U.S. 596, 609-610 (1972), see note 77. 
37
  See, e.g., Polygram, note 28. 
38
  United States v. VISA USA, Inc., 344 F3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003) (agreements); United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 253 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (monopolization); United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 
F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (merger). See also Gavil, note 10, at 737 (describing this trend). In a rule of 
reason case, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the net effect of the conduct at issue is to reduce 
competition. See Andrew I. Gavil, Burden of Proof in Antitrust Law, in 1 American Bar Association 
Antitrust Section, Issues in Competition Law and Policy 125 (2008). 
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The influence has been most pronounced in the field of merger control in the US, where 
judicial decisions frequently employ the methodology set out Burin agency guidelines.
39
 
Other US guidelines specifically designed to shape the treatment of conduct involving 
concerted action have had less success in shaping doctrine.
40
 In the EU, in contrast, 
guidelines have been more influential with businesses frequently looking to them for 
direction. 
Although guidelines and other supplemental tools are valuable elements of the EU and US 
competition law systems, the litigation of cases and the issuance of judicial decisions 
continue to supply the most important source of policy development. As noted below, a basic, 
sustaining level of litigation is necessary to give courts opportunities to upgrade doctrine as 
understanding about the competitive significance of individual practices evolves, and the 
state of the analytical art, as advanced in commentary and enforcement agency practice, 
improves. 
F. The Impact of the Enforcement Structure 
The mechanism chosen for enforcement can exert a major influence over the competition 
system’s reliance on rules or standards. One important determinant is the presence or absence 
of criminal sanctions for infringements.
41
 A jurisdiction with criminal sanctions may feel a 
stronger need, than a system enforced solely through civil punishments, to delineate clear 
categories of forbidden behaviour. In this context, rules of per se illegality serve to provide 
plain warning to business officials of when the state will impose criminal sanctions. This 
clarity can be essential to establish, in the eyes of jurors and courts (in sentencing decisions), 
that serious sanctions are warranted. A criminal enforcement regime that relied on standards 
might well be seen as illegitimate, and jurors might readily be persuaded not to convict 
individuals who are claimed to have transgressed an arguably hazy legal command. For this 
reason, and to facilitate effective criminal enforcement, the US Department of Justice has 
insisted on preserving the recognition of certain horizontal restraints as illegal per se and not 
subject to qualification. 
An antitrust system that prescribes civil monetary sanctions can face the same challenge. As 
civil penalties become more severe (e.g., mandatory treble damages in private US antitrust 
suits and huge fines in EU administrative procedures), there may a perceived need to clarify 
the circumstances – e.g., by setting bright line rules to condemn or to exculpate – in which 
infringements will trigger such sanctions. If civil sanctions are powerful, and courts believe 
them to be excessive in important categories of cases, judges may use a variety of 
                                                 
39
  See United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011). On the elements of effective 
agency guidance, see Hillary |Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in 
Antitrust Discourse, 48 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 771 (2006); William Blumenthal, Clear Agency Guidelines: 
Lessons from 1982, 68 Antitrust L.J. 5 (2000) 
40
  U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among 
Competitors (2000), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/joint-
venture-hearings-antitrust-guidelines-collaboration-among-competitors/ftcdojguidelines-2.pdf. On the US 
competitor collaboration guidelines, see Robert A. Skitol, Yes, the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines Are 
Ripe for Revision, Antitrust, Summer 2016, at 42; W. Stephen Smith et al., Revising the Competitor 
Collaboration Guidelines: Three Easy Pieces, Antitrust, Summer 2016, at 47. 
41
 See generally CRIMINALISING CARTELS (Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds., Hart Publishing, 2011).  
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“equilibration” techniques, including some of those already discussed, to make it more 
difficult for plaintiffs to avail themselves of per se rules of condemnation.
42
 
Another factor concerns the assignment of decision-making tasks in the resolution of antitrust 
disputes. The US antitrust system permits plaintiffs to demand jury trials in civil cases, and 
the norm among systems that impose criminal punishment is to try criminal cases before 
juries. The use of juries can press in the direction of employing bright lines to inform the 
deliberations of jurors. This reflects, in effect, concerns about the capacity of non-specialist 
jurors to sort through complex evidence relevant to a finding of guilt or innocence. Further, in 
the EU, for example, the initial decision to confer the right to decide whether an individual 
agreement satisfied the conditions of Article 101(3) on a sole integrated decision-taker, the 
Commission, appears to have had a significant impact on substantive doctrine. The 
Commission’s exclusive right over Article 101(3) seems to have inspired, or at least 
encouraged, its early formalistic interpretation to the concept of a restriction of competition 
under Article 101(1), which brought many agreements within it and consequently cemented 
the Commission’s central role in the development of EU competition policy.43 The 
subsequent transition to a decentralised enforcement system in the EU – relying on the 
national enforcement agencies and national courts as well as the Commission – may also be 
encouraging support for clearer rules which facilitate uniform and consistent interpretation of 
the law throughout the EU. 
Concerns about the capacity of the institutions entrusted with implementation have also 
emerged in debates about the choice of rules or standards in older competition law systems 
and in newer regimes established in transition economies. The Supreme Court’s frequent 
endorsement of per se rules to condemn from the 1940s into the early 1970s rested in part on 
a stated concern that courts were ill-equipped to assess economic arguments and evidence 
that would be submitted as part of a more elaborate examination of certain business 
practices.
44
 The attractiveness of bright-line rules might be still stronger in in settings where 
the initial conditions favourable to enforcement in older market systems (e.g., broad business 
awareness of competition law, high quality courts, and skilled enforcement agencies) are 
lacking. In such settings, a case might be made for the adoption of simpler rules to educate 
businesses about their duties, to inform the enforcement decisions of competition agencies, 
and to guide the courts in evaluating challenged conduct. 
3. ANALYSIS IN THE UNITED STATES  
The United States has the most extensive experience in addressing the issues introduced in 
Section 2. As described above, the general progression in US doctrine has been toward 
recognition of an analytical continuum whose boundaries are set, respectively, by a rule of 
categorical condemnation (per se illegality) and an elaborate, fact-intensive assessment of 
reasonableness.
45
 These poles are connected by a range of intermediate tests that seek to 
                                                 
42
  Steven Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies 
in the Antitrust System, 74 Geo. L.J. 1065 (1986). 
43
  See note 121 and text; see also Sir Christopher Bellamy, “Restriction of Competition” – A Historical 
Approach, in The Notion of Restriction of Competition 31, 35-36 (Damien Gerard et al. eds., 2017) 
(discussing tendency of European Commission prior to 2004 to interpret “restriction of competition” under 
Article 101 broadly). 
44
  See discussion of United States v. Topco Assocs. Inc., 405 U.S. 569, 609-10 & n.10 (1972) note 75 and text. 
45
  See Crane, Rules Versus Standards note 9, at 50 (“Antitrust finds itself in the midst of a creeping transition 
from rules to standards.”). 
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combine some of the clarity and economy of bright-line rules with the greater analytical 
accuracy that a fuller examination of evidence can produce. 
A. Goals  
Since the late 1970s, the US courts have accepted view that antitrust law is a “consumer 
welfare prescription.”46 This indicates that US law is concerned with claims by individual 
firms only to the extent that their injury corresponds to harm to consumer interests. The 
disappearance of firms that does not impose such harm is irrelevant to modern US antitrust 
analysis. The focus on consumer welfare generally distinguishes US law from what 
economists refer to as a “total welfare” test, which is indifferent to redistributions of wealth 
from consumers to producers, so long as challenged business practices have positive 
efficiency effects.
47
 As applied by US enforcement agencies and courts, the consumer welfare 
standard generally recognizes efficiency claims only if the asserted efficiencies are passed 
along to consumers.  
The modern consumer welfare, efficiency orientation of US doctrine departs significantly 
from earlier jurisprudence which said antitrust law willingly should sacrifice efficiency 
considerations in order to protect smaller firms and preserve a more egalitarian business 
environment. As Professors Roger Blair and Daniel Sokol observe, the modern US approach 
to goals reflects the view that the pursuit of other policy goals is best left to other fields of 
public policy. The US antitrust system is: 
‘technocratic in the sense that antitrust be defined narrowly to examine only those 
issues that are purely without antitrust’s ability to be measured and understood using 
industrial organization as the basis for economic analysis. This technocratic approach 
moves non-competition economic considerations to areas such as sector regulation, 
the legislative process, or executive fiat. Such areas are better equipped than antitrust 
to deal with political trade-offs between law and policy.
48
 
In recognizing this consensus, we do not assert that it is immutable. In recent years, many 
commentators have argued that the consumer welfare orientation deflects needed attention 
away from other valid policy aims, including the correction of disparities in wealth within the 
US society.
49
 Appeals to populist values have appeared frequently in recent US political 
discourse, including specific references to the need to reorient future antitrust enforcement. 
Without predicting that these utterances foreshadow a reformulation of goals, at least in 
public enforcement, it is enough to observe that adjustments in the now 40-year-long 
commitment to the consumer welfare objective are hardly impossible.  
                                                 
46
  See e.g., Reiter v Sonotone Corp 442 US 330, at 343 (1979) and NCAA, note 28, at 107–08. Statements of 
US enforcement officials make frequent reference to “consumer welfare” as the focus of antitrust policy. See 
e.g., Joel L. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice, Rethinking 
Antitrust Policies for the New Economy 1-2 (Speech before the Haas/Berkeley New Economic Forum, 
Portola Valley, California, May 9, 2000). 
47
  See Albertina Albors-Llorens & Alison Jones, The Images of the “Consumer” in EU Competition Law, in 
THE IMAGES OF THE CONSUMER IN EU LAW 43, 46-48 (Dorota Leczykewicz & Stephan Weatherill eds., 
Bloomsbury, 2016) (discussing US goals framework).  
48
  Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in US and EU Antitrust Enforcement (2013) 81 
Fordham Law Review 2497, 2505 
49
  See Barak Orbach, The Goals of Antitrust, 821 Ford. L. Rev. 2151 (2013) (discussing varied aims of 
competition law systems). 
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B. Rules or Standards? 
The basic command of Section One of the Sherman Act is stated in clear-cut terms: “Every 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . 
is declared to be illegal.”50 The seemingly absolute language of the statutory text recites none 
of the analytical concepts – for example, “per se illegality,” “ancillary restraints,” “truncated 
rule of reason” – that decisions since 1890 have recognized. The courts have developed these 
ideas through a common law decision-making process that Congress deliberately anticipated 
when it adopted the Sherman Act. The courts (and the FTC) were to adapt doctrine in light of 
new learning in economics and law about the operational content of antitrust.
51
 
The jurisprudence of the courts since 1890, and of the FTC since 1914, has displayed 
recurring tensions in choosing between rules and standards to address concerted practices. 
These tribunals have struggled to balance the aims, described in Section 2 above, of making 
accurate decisions while minimizing administrative burdens and providing predictability. One 
interpretation of the early decades of the Sherman Act is that courts experimented with 
different approaches to resolve the tension between rules and standards. One formative 
approach emerged in the Justice Department’s prosecution of Standard Oil for 
monopolization of the petroleum industry. The Standard Oil decision in 1911 announced that 
Section One of the Sherman Act established a single, general principle for the assessment of 
trade restraints: The “rule of reason” would govern the evaluation of business behaviour.52 As 
the Court later observed in Chicago Board of Trade, the “true test of legality” under this 
standard “is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby 
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.”53 
The Standard Oil judgment reflected, at least implicitly, awareness that not all cases 
demanded an expansive inquiry. Within the framework of what it called “the standard of 
reason,”54 the Standard Oil Court embraced the idea articulated in earlier cases that some 
restraints might be so manifestly injurious that courts could forego a more elaborate inquiry 
and condemn they out of hand.
55
 The Court noted that the “nature and character” of certain 
agreements might create a “conclusive presumption” that the conduct violated Section One.56 
This set the foundation for what later would be seen as a dichotomy model of Section One, 
with conduct placed in one of two distinct baskets: summary condemnation (per se illegality) 
                                                 
50
  15 U.S.C. § 1. 
51
  State Oil, note 26, 20 (noting role of courts in US antitrust law “in recognizing and adapting to changed 
circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience”); National Society of Professional Engineers v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (in adopting the Sherman Act, Congress “expected the courts to 
give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition”). 
52
  Standard Oil, note 21, at 60 (“The standard of reason . . . was intended to be the measure used for the 
purpose of determining whether in a given case a particular actor had or had not brought about the wrong 
against which [Sherman Act Section One] provided.”). The Court announced that the rule of reason also 
governed the application of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and its prohibition against monopolization and 
attempts to monopolize. 
53
  Chicago Board of Trade, note 18, at 238. 
54
  221 U.S. at 60. 
55
  Earlier cases had applied the principle that the evaluation of practices within the coverage of Section One did 
not invariably require extensive fact gathering or analysis. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 
166 U.S. 290 (1897); Addyston Pipe note 27.  
56
  211 U.S. at 60 (citing Trans-Missouri Freight and other cases). 
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and a fuller assessment of reasonableness, which becomes known, by reason of commentary 
interpreting the formulation set out in Chicago Board of Trade, as a full-blown rule of reason 
analysis.
57
 
A second important experiment in the Sherman Act’s formative era appeared in the Judge 
(later President and Chief Justice) William Howard Taft’s opinion for the Sixth Circuit in 
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co..
58
 Taft wrote against the backdrop of seemingly 
inconsistent Supreme Court decisions which, on the one hand, had adopted a literalist reading 
of Section One and concluded that “every” agreement that restrained trade violated the statute 
without regard to its asserted reasonableness
59
 and, on the other hand, appeared to call for a 
more context-specific analysis that accounted for efficiency-related justifications.
60
 Taft 
reconciled these approaches with a concept that came to be known as “ancillarity”.61 By this 
concept, “naked” agreements by competitors to set prices, allocate customers, or divide 
markets warranted categorical prohibition without study of actual effects; harmful 
consequences would be presumed.
62
 At the same time, restrictions that served to make 
efficiency-enhancing arrangements (e.g., the sale of a business encompassing an increment of 
value for good will, or the setting of prices by partners in a law firm) deserved more elaborate 
analysis because they were “ancillary” to legitimate transactions.63 
Taft’s opinion introduced concepts that re-entered the antitrust mainstream in the 1970s with 
the publication of Robert Bork’s Antitrust Paradox,64 which prominently featured Judge 
Taft’s decision. Appearing at the close of the era of judicial enthusiasm for per se rules to 
condemn, Judge Bork’s treatise helped make Addyston Pipe an important foundation for a 
modern jurisprudence that has retreated from expansive reliance on rules of per se illegality 
and has depended more heavily on various forms of more elaborate reasonableness inquiries. 
First, the ancillary restraints doctrine, or “ancillarity” principle, underpins the initial 
characterization step in Section One cases. As Taft explained, the sensibility of Section One 
depended on the ability of courts to distinguish between naked agreements deserving 
summary condemnation and restraints that required a more elaborate inquiry as they 
contributed to a collaboration’s attainment of efficiencies (“ancillary restraints”).65 Secondly, 
Taft’s opinion outlined a structured mechanism for conducting a more detailed inquiry, which 
included consideration of the proportionality of the restraint (were less restrictive alternatives 
available to accomplish valid objectives?). As we note below, modern decisions that have 
altered the balance between rules and standards have sought to devise a new framework that 
subsumes the ancillarity concept into a larger reformulation of Section One doctrine. Thus, 
ancillarity retains independent significance today, even though a modern restatement of 
                                                 
57
  See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
58
  Addyston Pipe note 27 
59
  Trans-Missouri note 55. 
60
  United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 567 (1898). 
61
  Addyston Pipe note 27, at 281-82.  
62
  Id. 
63
  Id. 
64
  Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (Basic Books 1978). 
65
  See note 81 and text. 
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doctrine might helpfully retire the concept as a distinct strand of analysis and instead 
incorporate its analytical insights into a new Section One framework.  
Supreme Court decisions of the 1920s and 1930s struggled to elaborate the Section One 
analytical framework established in Standard Oil: an overarching rule of reason within which 
some types of agreements might be treated as inherently unreasonable, owing to their harmful 
“nature and character.” In 1927, the Court appeared to give effect to the latter possibility by 
treating a cartel of sanitary pottery suppliers (which collectively accounted for a dominant 
share of sales) as illegal per se and rejecting the defendants’ arguments made about the 
reasonableness of prices collectively established.
66
 Six years later, with the US in the grips of 
the Depression, the Court refused the request of the Justice Department to declare a joint 
selling arrangement of coal producers to be illegal per se and instead spoke sympathetically 
of the defendants’ aim to respond to the harms of destructive overproduction and depressed 
prices.
67
 
In the mid- to late-1930s, national economic policy shifted away from experiments with 
national planning and government-business alliances that compelled rivals to cooperate in 
setting output levels. Competition law ascended as an economic policy tool, and the Supreme 
Court dramatically established the primacy of per se rules to address certain forms of 
agreements. In 1940 in Socony-Vacuum, the Court held that per se condemnation was 
appropriate for a broad range of horizontal agreements that affected prices.
68
 Over roughly 
the next three decades, the Court made clear that a rule of per se illegality applied to customer 
or territory allocations,
69
 some concerted refusals to deal,
70
 and a wide range of vertical 
restraints.
71
  
The broad acceptance of per se rules of illegality in this period reflected two related concerns. 
First, the Supreme Court, perhaps reflecting upon the open-ended formulation it had endorsed 
in Chicago Board of Trade,
72
 came to perceive the rule of reason to be a terribly difficult 
standard to apply in practice. As the Court explained in 1958 in Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
United States,
73
 a rule of per se illegality sidestepped these burdens: “This principle of per se 
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  United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). 
67
  Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). The Court distinguished the case from Trenton 
Potteries, pointing out that the defendants in the latter case accounted for 82 percent of the relevant market, 
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purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in 
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  Topco note 44, at 608-10; Timken note 24, at 597-98. 
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  Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959). 
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  Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-54 (1968) (maximum RPM); Schwinn note 24, at 379 (vertical 
territorial restrictions). 
72
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is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, 
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  356 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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unreasonableness . . . avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged 
economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related 
industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been 
unreasonable – an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.”74 Second, the Court 
indicated that it was incapable of performing the more elaborate analysis, especially the 
assessment of economic arguments, that the rule of reason appeared to require.
75
  
By the early 1970s, US jurisprudence portrayed the analytical choices available under Section 
One as sharply dichotomous: a quick, administrable rule of per se illegality, or a hopelessly 
complex reasonableness standard that was likely to exculpate defendants. This portrayal 
provided no recognition that the broad application of the per se rule might entail significant 
efficiency losses, or that intermediate methods might be developed to make a more elaborate 
analysis manageable.  
Since the mid-1970s, the Court has revisited these assumptions – with dramatic effects. It has 
concluded that various practices once subject to categorical prohibition yielded important 
economic benefits in too many cases to be condemned out of hand, and it identified ways in 
which a more elaborate assessment could be undertaken without recourse to the indeterminate 
inquiry suggested by Chicago Board of Trade. Pronounced concerns with overinclusiveness 
and greater confidence in administrability inspired the shift documented above: the 
withdrawal of numerous forms of behaviour from the class of matters worthy of categorical 
prohibition,
76
 and the replacement of the dichotomy model of Section One with a continuum 
in which per se liability and fuller reasonable inquiries are linked by intermediate tests – 
called quick look or truncated forms of analysis -- that permit a phased, structured 
examination of evidenced bearing on efficiency justifications.
77
   
C. Rules of per se illegality 
Consistent with the approach anticipated in Standard Oil in 1911 and reinforced in Socony-
Vacuum and later decisions, US courts today apply a rule of per se illegality rule for 
agreements that are deemed to have harmful effects in the typical case. As suggested above, 
the decision about what to place in the category of per se illegality requires a judgment about 
how often observed conduct has harmful effects. US doctrine now reserves this approach 
mainly for horizontal agreements (including price fixing, schemes to allocate customers or 
geographic regions – unless ancillary to a collaboration that enhances efficiency) and not for 
conduct with more ambiguous consequences, such as vertical agreements,
78
 mergers and 
single-firm exclusionary behaviour. In principle, the category could be expanded to include 
other forms of conduct which theory and experience show to have, or almost always have, 
harmful effects. The Supreme Court has indicated that the expansion of the category depends 
partly on the extent of “experience” that courts have had with the practice,79 yet its decisions 
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order to maintain a flexible approach”). 
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  See Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), State Oil, note 26, and Leegin note 8. 
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  See NCAA, note 28, Federal Trade Commission v Indiana Federation of Dentists 476 U.S. 447 (1986), 
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  Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (“Once experience with a particular 
kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it has 
applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is unreasonable.”). 
18 
 
do not discuss the quantum of necessary experience, nor do they identify the process by 
which a court should conclude that the requisite critical mass of experience has been 
achieved. 
As already outlined an important development in the US has accompanied the refinement of 
the category of behaviour worthy of summary condemnation through the incorporation of an 
initial classification step based on the Addyston Pipe ancillarity framework.
80
 In 1979 in 
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (“BMI”),81 the Supreme Court 
brought characterization out of the shadows and recognized it as the inevitable starting point 
of a Section One inquiry.
82
 The blanket copyright licenses at issue in BMI, literally taken, 
were agreements to fix prices, yet the Court said this fact by itself did not mean that the 
agreements warranted per se condemnation. Before it decides that conduct belongs in a 
category of activity subject to per se prohibition, it must ask whether the defendants had a 
cognizable business justification.
83
 To characterize the conduct, the court asks two related 
questions. First, is the practice “plainly anticompetitive” in the sense that it “facially appears 
to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease 
output?
84
 Second, is the practice at issue “designed to increase economic efficiency and 
render markets more, rather than less, competitive”?85 BMI thus abandoned the notion that 
the Section One analytical framework posits a sharp dichotomy between per se illegality and 
a full-blown rule of reason. As noted below, this development was followed by several 
Supreme Court decisions – notably, NCAA86 and Indiana Federation of Dentists87 – that 
endorsed intermediate forms of scrutiny as alternatives to a full-blown rule of reason inquiry. 
The analysis in BMI raises the possibility that the label of per se illegality itself is a 
misnomer. As Thomas Krattenmaker has pointed out, BMI contemplates that the defendant 
always has an opportunity to present what the courts regard to be cognizable justifications, 
such as the value of a challenged restraint in facilitating cooperation that leads to the 
introduction of a new product that would not be available without cooperation and the 
facilitating restraint.
88
 Professor Krattenmaker makes a persuasive argument that the Court 
has not established rules of per se illegality so much as it has declared certain defences to be 
per se unacceptable. By this view, the courts have specified a range of defences that so not 
entitle the defendants to a more elaborate inquiry. In terms of the BMI framework, the 
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defendants are not entitled to a fuller review if they argue, in the characterization process, 
that they set reasonable prices, that competition deprives them of needed levels of 
profitability, that they lack market power needed for an output restriction to affect prices, that 
they restricted rivalry with regard to a more popular product as a means to encourage 
consumers to purchase more of a product they regarded as inferior, or that they never actually 
implemented their output restriction scheme.   
The express recognition of characterization as a way to test efficiency claims at the threshold 
of Section One analysis and the development of intermediate methods to apply the rule of 
reason did not resolve enduring concerns that courts – including the Supreme Court – had 
about the application of per se rules that had survived the retrenchment that took place after 
the early 1970s. One concern was that one of the rules of per se illegality – the ban on resale 
price maintenance (“RPM”) established in 1911 in Dr Miles Medical Co v John D Park & 
Sons Co
89
 – was excessively overinclusive in its tendency to forbid arrangements that had 
important redeeming competitive features. For nearly a century, the Court sought to confine 
the reach of the Dr. Miles rule, not directly by altering the substantive test itself, but 
indirectly through equilibration by manipulating the definition of agreement in the RPM 
context.  
The first equilibration move came in United States v Colgate & Co
90
 in 1919, when the Court 
ruled that no agreement was formed if the manufacturer announced its refusal to deal with 
discounters and proceeded to terminate any retailer that deviated from its policy. Sixty years 
later, in deciding in Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.
91
 that non-price vertical 
restraints were to be governed by the rule of reason, the Court expressly disavowed any intent 
to tamper with the per se prohibition for RPM. As the personal papers of Supreme Court 
Justice Lewis Powell indicate,
92
 the Court considered the possibility in Monsanto Co v Spray-
Rite Serv Corp
93
 in 1984 of taking the step it had foregone in Sylvania: to eliminate the per se 
ban on RPM. Fearing that repudiation of Dr. Miles would lead Congress to amend Section 
One to ban RPM categorically, the Court pursued another strategy. First in Monsanto and 
later in Business Electronics,
94
 the Court left the rule of Dr. Miles in place but heightened the 
proof that plaintiffs must introduce to demonstrate the existence of an agreement to set a 
resale price. Through this form of equilibration, the Court eroded the impact a per se rule it 
perceived to be unwise by making it more difficult for plaintiffs to establish the key predicate 
to a successful suit – that the defendant had formed an agreement to set resale prices. In a 
separate line of cases, the Court ruled that the private plaintiff could not recover damages for 
an admitted instance of minimum RPM unless it showed that the challenged conduct reduced 
competition.
95
 This application of the antitrust injury requirement recognized in Brunswick 
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Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.
96
 in 1977 had the effect of converting a per se offense into 
a reasonableness analysis with respect to the entitlement to monetary relief. 
In Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.
97
 the Court finally focused directly on 
the substantive rule of per se illegality, overturned the principle of Dr. Miles, and made 
minimum RPM a rule of reason offense.
98
 As noted below, responding to administrability 
concerns raised by Justice Breyer’s dissent, the Court majority took some steps to suggest 
how a rule of reason might be applied to RPM in the future and thus preserve a genuine 
means for policing competitively harmful applications of the practice. 
A second form of judicial equilibration has involved the ban on horizontal output restrictions. 
In the modern era, the Supreme Court has not wavered from the principle that horizontal 
price-fixing, customer allocations, and territorial divisions, if unrelated to an integration of 
effort that yields efficiencies, warrant per se condemnation. Nonetheless, the Court has 
expressed repeated concerns that the use of private rights of action in the US system (which 
feature mandatory trebling of damages, fee recovery by victorious plaintiffs, availability of 
class actions, jury trials, joint and several liability, and recourse to extensive discovery tools) 
presented a serious risk of overdeterrence in horizontal restraints cases and in matters 
involving single-firm conduct. In Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. V. Zenith Radio Corp.
99
 in 
1986 and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
100
 in 2006, the Court heightened the tests that 
plaintiffs must satisfy to plead and prove concerted action. In doing so, the Court has made it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to avail themselves of a nominally powerful rule of liability. 
A subject of continuing controversy is the continuing habit of US courts to use the 
terminology of per se illegality to condemn certain tying arrangements. In Jefferson Parish 
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
101
 the court majority rejected the suggestion of the four concurring 
justices that the per se label badly fit a rule that required a showing of market power in the 
tying product to establish the defendant’s capacity to coerce buyers to acquire the tied 
product, as well.
102
 The majority said that it was too late in the Court’s jurisprudence to 
suggest that tying was not per se illegal. One can confidently anticipate that, in light of 
developments described above, that the Supreme Court in a future tying case will take the 
opportunity to change the vocabulary it has used to describe the tying offense. One possibility 
is to say that tying is evaluated with a structured rule of reason that uses, among other 
techniques, a market power screen to determine liability and an assessment of efficiency 
justifications. 
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Before departing from our discussion of the per se rule of illegality in US jurisprudence, we 
underscore the dangers of relying on indirect methods such as equilibration to address 
imperfections in the substantive rule itself. The manipulation of the agreement requirement to 
offset perceived overinclusiveness in the per se rule of Dr. Miles introduced serious, enduring 
distortions into US jurisprudence. Concepts used to cabin the reach of what the Court 
perceived to be an improvidently broad legal command for RPM (per se illegality) have 
shaped the definition of agreement more generally and have arguably undermined the 
effectiveness of a wisely cast ban on various horizontal restraints.
103
 This tendency in US 
cases demonstrates an important hazard of resorting to bright-line rules to condemn conduct 
with ambiguous competitive effects. Perceiving the imperfections of the bright-line rule, 
courts for various reasons may be reluctant to reformulate the substantive rule itself and 
instead may turn to second-best solutions (e.g., equilibration) that distort the application of 
the law and rob the system of its coherence.  
As described above, the trend in modern US jurisprudence has been to reduce the number of 
offenses deemed to be illegal per se. This does not mean that the category could not be 
expanded in the future. Within the field of horizontal restraints, the courts since Socony have 
expanded the range of restrictions that fall within the general prohibition of behaviour that 
amounts to price-fixing. The offense includes not only the establishment of output levels or 
ultimate prices, but also agreements to use only certain types of inputs, to fix credit terms, to 
forego advertising, or to refuse to engage in competitive bidding.
104
 Decisions have cautioned 
that admission into the per se category must be based on assessments of a practice’s 
“demonstrable economic effect,”105 and it is safe to say, based on the Supreme Court’s recent 
analysis of “reverse payments” in the pharmaceutical sector,106 that the expansion of the per 
se illegal category will not be easily accomplished. Nonetheless, one can imagine that future 
decisions might extend the per se ban to practices that are shown to have dangerous 
competitive effects and seldom present efficiency justifications. One candidate is the use of 
“no-poaching” agreements by which firms restrict competition for talented employees.107 
D. Rules of Per Se Legality or Safe Harbours? 
Professor Crane and other commentators have argued that antitrust policy should be attentive 
to possibilities for declaring practices to be per se legal when the conduct trends to have 
beneficial or benign competitive effects and efforts to police the behaviour with antitrust 
oversight poses serious risks of discouraging the conduct in the first place.  US jurisprudence 
can be said to have embraced this proposition, at least to some extent. Examples would 
include the Colgate protection in the RPM disputes for purely “unilateral” efforts by a 
manufacturer to state a policy of no-discounting and of terminating retailers who violate it; 
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the general immunity from predatory pricing claims that firms enjoy if they set their prices 
above their total costs; and other decisions that suggest US law does not reach price squeeze 
claims or refusals to license intellectual property.
108
 One can also point to the use of market 
share screens in the application of the rule against tying. A further example, in the realm of 
public merger enforcement policy, is the use of safe harbours to exempt from challenge 
transactions below certain HHI thresholds.
109
  
In addition to more formalized safe harbours, one can say that actual patterns in enforcement 
and adjudication make clear that firms are unlikely to incur liability (though they may 
occasionally have to litigate to avoid it) for certain types of practices. Researchers have 
documented that, since Sylvania, defendants have won an overwhelming share of all litigated 
nonprice vertical restraint disputes.
110
 Agency enforcement prioritisation also has played an 
important role in determining the number of litigation events. The US federal agencies have 
prosecuted no Robinson-Patman Act price discrimination claims since 2000.
111
 In 1976, the 
Justice Department declared that it would not enforce the statute, even though one section of 
the Robinson Patman Act provides criminal sanctions which DOJ alone can seek.
112
  
E. Rule of Reason Analysis 
Modern US jurisprudence has responded to the concern, which motivated expanded recourse 
to rules of per se illegality between 1940 and the early 1970s, that the rule of reason as 
conceived in Chicago Board of Trade was an intolerable administrative burden for courts and 
a near-guarantee of pro-defendant outcomes. In general terms, lower court decisions in the 
US have identified essentially three stages to a reasonableness analysis:
113
 
 Stage One: The plaintiff bears the initial burden of producing evidence tending to show 
that the challenged conduct has anticompetitive effects. The plaintiff can meet this burden 
in various ways, depending on the quality of evidence indicating competitive harm. 
 Stage Two: Once the plaintiff produces evidence tending to demonstrate anticompetitive 
effects, the burden shifts to the defendant to present a cognizable justification for its 
conduct. Where the probability of harm is high, and the likelihood of a suitable 
justification is low, the presumption of harm becomes irrebuttable. Otherwise, the 
defendant can rebut the plaintiff’s case either by contesting evidence used to create a 
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presumption of competitive harm, or by introducing evidence that the conduct is benign 
or procompetitive. 
 Stage Three: If both parties have met their respective burdens in Stages One and Two, the 
court will assess all of the evidence to determine whether the plaintiff’s hypothesis of 
harm is more likely than not. This phase sometimes is referred to as “balancing.” In 
performing this third stage, some courts have considered whether the defendant’s valid 
procompetitive justifications could have been accomplished by recourse to less 
competitively restrictive means. The criterion of less restrictive alternatives (LRAs) was 
developed chiefly in the identification of ancillary restraints, but its modern application 
has not been limited to such cases and now can be seen as one element of a structured rule 
of reason inquiry.  
Two decisions in the 1980s set the foundation for the modern framework by recognizing 
intermediate alternatives to summary condemnation and a full-blown rule of reason inquiry. 
In National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,114 
the Supreme Court concluded that when the presence of plausible, cognizable efficiency 
justifications precluded summary prohibition under the per se rule, a full rule of reason 
analysis was not invariably necessary. Sometimes a restraint’s competitive harm will be 
apparent from an abbreviated reasonableness analysis that avoids an inquiry, for example, 
into the defendant’s market power;115 “when there is an agreement not to compete in terms of 
prices or output, ‘no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the 
anticompetitive character of such an agreement.’”116 The Court considered the defendant’s 
efficiency claims, but did so in the framework of a truncated analysis. It rejected the assertion 
that the challenged restrictions were needed to shield an inferior product from competition 
from a superior product, and it held that justifications for an otherwise unlawful restraint 
must be reasonably “tailored” to achieve a procompetitive aim.117  
Two years later, in Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists (IFD),
118
 the 
Supreme Court again recognized the existence of “quick look” or “truncated” variants of the 
rule of reason. The Court held “no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the 
anticompetitive nature” of an agreement among members of a dental society to refuse to 
provide x-rays to insurers who were processing claims on behalf of consumers of dental 
care.
119
 The Court explained: “Absent some countervailing procompetitive virtue – such as, 
for example, the creation of efficiencies in the operation of a market or the provision of goods 
and services – such an agreement limiting consumer choice by impeding the ‘ordinary give 
and take of the market place,’ . . . cannot be sustained under the Rule of Reason.120 
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As a group, BMI, NCAA, and IFD indicated that the assessment of horizontal agreements 
occurs along an analytical continuum in which the court evaluates behaviour in a level of 
detail necessary to comprehend its competitive effects. In 1992 in California Dental 
Association v. Federal Trade Commission,
121
 the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged 
that its earlier cases recognized an abbreviated or “quick look” variant of the rule of 
reason.
122
 The Court underscored the trend toward a continuum, rather than dichotomous, 
model of analysis: “The truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are 
less fixed than terms like ‘per se,’ ‘quick look,’ and ‘rule of reason’ tend to make them 
appear.”123 The elaborateness of the analysis depended on context: “As the circumstances 
here demonstrate, there is generally no categorical line to be drawn between restraints that 
give rise to an intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and those that call for 
more detailed treatment. What is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for the case, looking to 
the circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint.”124  
The Court’s modern decisions have provided limited guidance about how the new conception 
of the rule of reason should be applied, and how, in particular, abbreviated variants are to be 
structured. Lower court decisions have sought to add this analytical architecture. A 
noteworthy example is the court of appeals decision in Polygram Holding, Inc. v. Federal 
Trade Commission,
125
 which endorsed a truncated analysis framework employed by the FTC 
to assess restrictions that rival record labels had imposed upon each other in connection with 
the introduction of a commonly produced concert recording. In the Polygram framework, the 
plaintiff begins by demonstrating that that conduct is “inherently suspect” in its obvious 
tendency, based on a survey of its character and its similarity to other restraints found to 
present serious competitive dangers. The defendant then must come forward with plausible, 
legally cognizable justifications for the behaviour. If the defendant provides such justification 
evidence, the plaintiff then must explain why the court may conclude, without further 
evidence, that anticompetitive effects are likely to predominate, or to provide evidence 
suggesting that such an outcome is likely. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the evidentiary 
burden shifts to the defendant to show that the restraint does not harm consumers or has net 
procompetitive virtues. The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion in establishing 
all elements of the offense. 
In a general way, Polygram’s burden-shifting approach resembles the framework that the 
same court used to decide the monopolization suit prosecuted by the Justice Department 
against Microsoft.
126
 There the Court described the Section Two inquiry as having the 
following basic steps.
127
 The plaintiff first presents a theory of anticompetitive harm (which 
typically entails a demonstration that the defendant possesses substantial market power), and 
the defendant then offers justifications for its behaviour.  If the parties have presented a mix 
of procompetitive and anticompetitive evidence, the court then balances the proof to 
determine liability. 
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One area that begs for future application of these or similar frameworks is RPM. In Leegin, 
the Supreme Court did not simply take minimum RPM out of the per se illegality 
compartment but went on to describe four scenarios in which RPM might be harmful and 
spelled out three criteria to be used to identify harmful applications of the restraint.
128
 The US 
federal agencies have done little to develop a framework for applying this guidance in 
practice. Following Leegin in 2007, the DOJ and the FTC have prosecuted no RPM cases.
129
 
Their only contributions to the elaboration of a post-Leegin analytical framework have 
consisted of an FTC decision in 2008 to modify an RPM order premised on a per se illegality 
theory before Leegin, and a DOJ speech in 2009 on the application of the rule of reason to 
RPM in the future.
130
 Given its capacity to use administrative adjudication, the FTC would be 
an appropriate forum in which to discuss how to apply the rule of reason to RPM in the post-
Leegin world. 
In all matters involving agreements, the courts have taken few opportunities to address the 
relationship between the characterization process, the rule of reason and the concept of 
ancillarity introduced in Addyston Pipe and still referred to today in joint venture analysis.
131
 
Gregory Werden’s interpretation of recent cases finds that when a restraint is deemed to be 
reasonably necessary to achieve the venture’s legitimate aims, the rule of reason is then 
applied to assess the competitive significance of venture and the collateral restraint as a 
package.
132
 This provides significant protection for restraints imposed to execute the core 
functions of a legitimate venture.
133
 When, however, a restraint is deemed not to be collateral 
to the performance of such core functions, it is analysed separately from the venture.  
A related point involves the concept of LRAs and how it builds upon or extends the principle 
of ancillarity. The LRA concept embodies a principle of proportionality that might be 
exemplified in a burden shifting approach, especially to test the defendant’s reasonable 
business justifications.  There is considerable contemporary debate about how to apply the 
LRA concept and, more generally, to engage in the balancing of anticompetitive harms and 
procompetitive benefits that is the final potential stage of the rule of reason in a burden-
shifting approach.
134
 A frequently expressed fear is that the application of the LRA test 
invites indeterminate ex post speculation about how the defendants might otherwise have 
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achieved their aims, with inadequate consideration of the options realistically available to the 
firms as they designed their strategy ex ante. 
F. Summary and Impact of the Enforcement System 
As suggested above, there are important links between the development of horizontal 
restraints analysis and the design of the US enforcement regime. First, the development of a 
criminal enforcement regime creates strong pressure to recognize per se illegality as a 
distinct, well-defined category of infringement. This works against attempts to depict the rule 
of reason as a continuum rather than a sharply dichotomous mechanism. In the US, DOJ has 
demanded recognition of a category of per se illegal offenses to assist in persuading juries 
and judges that certain behaviour deserves criminal punishment, especially the incarceration 
of individuals. Since the early 1980s, DOJ has focused criminal enforcement solely upon 
horizontal price-fixing, market and customer allocations, and related schemes. DOJ, and 
perhaps other prosecutors, dislike the notion that there is a “continuum” of illegal conduct, 
instead of a sharp dichotomy between acts always forbidden and acts sometimes allowed. 
Second, judicial perceptions about overreaching in the US system of private enforcement 
have induced significant efforts at equilibration in the form of heightened evidentiary and 
pleading standards that private plaintiffs must meet in order to invoke rules of per se liability. 
We do not assert that the judicial perceptions have sound empirical foundations; we do 
conclude that the perception exists. The fact of extensive equilibration, along with the 
distortions it can produce in antitrust doctrine, suggests an urgent need to determine, as an 
empirical matter, whether concerns about overdeterrence are well founded, and how the 
effects of overdeterrence match up with the benefits generated by the status quo private rights 
mechanism. To the extent that such concerns have a strong empirical basis, the solution likely 
rests in refinements of the private rights process that have been shown to cause 
overdeterrence. If further study shows the empirical basis to be lacking, the courts and 
enforcement agencies should take steps to unwind the equilibrating devices established to 
address perceived overdeterrence.  
Third, concerns about the capacity and expertise of the courts to deal with analytical 
complexities posed by the rule of reason might be resolved through greater use of the FTC’s 
administrative process to adjudicate cases. This would expand the FTC’s role in what 
Professor Crane has called “norms creation.”135 By this approach the FTC would play a larger 
role in the litigation of Section One cases with an eye toward applying its economic expertise 
to identify the form of inquiry suitable for individual restraints and to experiment with 
different methods for organizing the presentation and assessment of evidence. Well-reasoned 
FTC decisions would provide templates for possible adoption by the federal courts.  
4. ANALYSIS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  
A. The Goals of EU competition law 
One impediment to the creation of a clear framework of antitrust analysis in the EU is that the 
objectives of the competition rules are not clearly articulated. On the contrary, although they 
have undoubtedly evolved, they remain keenly contested.  
Since the end of the 1990s, the Commission has pursued the view that antitrust analysis is, or 
should be, underpinned by a consumer welfare objective and that this should be reflected in 
the interpretation of key terms such as “restriction” of competition (Article 101(1)), 
                                                 
135
  Daniel A. Crane, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT (Oxford 2011). 
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“improving the production or distribution of goods” and “promoting technical or economic 
progress” (Article 101(3)). Many Commission documents and guidelines now state that its 
inquiry under the three antitrust pillars focuses on consumer harm and consumer welfare 
within a similar structure for assessment involving:
136
 
1. Demonstration of anticompetitive effects (actual, likely or assumed137) in terms of 
parameters of competition (such as price, product quality or choice, innovation);
138
 
2. A balancing/ weighing of potential anticompetitive effects with likely efficiencies.139 
Although the Commission has always played a central role in enforcing EU competition law 
and in developing competition policy, it is the Court of Justice of the European Union which 
is charged with responsibility for interpreting EU law.
140
 A number of EU court judgments 
rely upon mainstream economic tools to shape and interpret EU competition law and have 
placed emphasis on the welfare of consumers within them.
141
 It cannot be said, however, that 
the case law unambiguously endorses consumer welfare as the ultimate objective of EU 
competition law.
142
 Rather, it has been guarded about ranking consumers’ interests over 
others. Indeed, some judgments of the EU courts have accepted that public policy objectives 
may override, or must be weighed against, the impact of conduct on competition and 
consumers,
143
 and numerous cases have stressed the importance of the competition rules in 
ensuring the integration of national markets and protecting the structure of competition within 
the EU.
144
  
The prominence attached in the cases to the single market objective
145
 is frequently raised as 
a factor which distinguishes EU competition law from other systems and some cases 
                                                 
136
  Esteva Mosso, note 15. 
137
  An important difference between Arts 101/102 and merger analysis, however (apart from the respective ex-
post/ ex -ante nature of the reviews) is that “hard-core restrictions and restrictions ‘by object’ under Article 
101 TFEU (which often, though not always, overlap) or “naked restriction” under Article 102 TFEU have no 
equivalent in merger control”, Esteva Mosso, note 15. 
138
  Under Art 101(1) (restriction of competition), Art 102 (an abuse of a dominant position) and/or the EU 
Merger Regulation (unilateral or coordinated effects liable to result in a significant impediment to effective 
competition).  
139
  A defence is explicitly provided for in Art 101(3), recognised in the EUMR (recital 29) and has been read 
into Art 102 case-law through acceptance of objective justifications for otherwise abusive behaviour. 
140
  See note 7 and text. 
141
  Even if not stated to be the laws sole or core objective. In C-67/13 P, Groupement des Cartes Bancaires (CB) 
v. Commission EU:C:2014:2204, for example, the CJ placed emphasis on the poor allocation of resources to 
the detriment, in particular, of consumers that results from certain types of collusive behaviour between 
firms liable to infringe Art 101, see note 179 and text. 
142
  The placement of the competition laws in a Treaty with multi-faceted objectives has complicated the 
question of whether it is possible for the law to evolve into “antitrust law pure and simple”, GUILIANO 
AMATO, ANTITRUST AND THE BOUNDS OF POWER 116 (1997).  
143
  See notes 211, 237, 251 and 252 and text. 
144
  See especially Case C-501/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v. Commission [2009] ECR I-9291, 
paras 61-63. 
145
  See e.g., Rein Wesseling, THE MODERNISATION OF EC ANTITRUST LAW (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000), 
48–49 (“Initially… [t]he antitrust rules were not more than private counterpart to the rules, enshrined in 
Articles 28-30 EC [the rules on free movement of goods]. … The first period … saw the Commission 
enforcing the rules with constant reference to ensuring the free flow of goods, thus promoting market 
integration.”) 
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undoubtedly elevate this concern over competition ones. Nonetheless, as the single market 
project is about realising efficiencies that bring welfare benefits, it is not clear that this 
objective should have to pull in a different direction to a consumer welfare one.
146
 The weight 
attached in the cases to the structure of competition, however, has led to significant 
disagreement between (i) those who stress the importance of competition law as a mechanism 
for preserving competition, safeguarding consumer choice and ensuring firms’ equal and 
undistorted access to the market;
147
 and (ii) those who adhere to the view that changes to the 
structure of the market are important only in so far as they are likely to harm competition and 
consumers.
148
 “This focus on consumer harm gives orientation and consistency to 
competition law enforcement, something that cannot be expected from the goal of preserving 
a certain (not defined) structure of the market or the goal of protecting the competitive 
process itself.”149 
These conflicting views about goals underpin much of the controversy about how key 
provisions of Article 101 should be interpreted.  
B. Rules or Standards? 
Material differences between Article 101 and Section One of the Sherman Act are the 
former’s bifurcated structure, its specific prohibition of restrictions by object as well as 
restrictions by effect
150
 and the fact that Regulation 1/2003 allocates the burden of proof as 
between the claimant (Article 101(1)) and defendant (Article 101(3)).
151
 Whilst Article 
101(1) prohibits agreements which appreciably restrict competition (by object or effect), 
Article 101(3) provides that the prohibition can be declared inapplicable to any agreement 
which satisfies its four conditions: that the agreement achieves specified benefits; that a fair 
share of those benefits are passed on to consumers; that the agreement does not contain any 
indispensable restraints; and that it does not eliminate competition in respect of a substantial 
part of the products in question. A number of block exemption regulations (“BER”s) exempt 
certain categories of agreement from Article 101(1). Although agreements meeting the 
conditions of a BER are presumed to meet the Article 101(3) criteria (see D below), in other 
                                                 
146
  Indeed, see Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) [now 101(3)] (“Art 101(3) Guidelines”) OJ [2004] 
C 101/97, para 42. 
147
  See e.g., P Behrens, The Ordoliberal Concept of “Abuse” of a Dominant Position and its Impact on Article 
102 TFEU in Paul Nihoul and I Takahashi, ABUSE REGULATION IN COMPETITION LAW, Proceedings of the 
10th ASCOLA Conference (2015). 
148
  Thus protecting the competitive process, and precluding hindrances to it, benefits consumers—that is, that 
protecting the market structure from artificial distortions is the best mechanism for protecting the interests of 
the consumer in the medium to longer term. 
149
  Luc Peeperkorn, Conditional pricing: Why the General Court is wrong in Intel and what the Court of Justice 
can do to rebalance the assessment of rebate, Concurrences Journal 1 (2015), at 48. 
150
  See notes 165-166 and text; see also Ben Smulders, The Bifurcated Approach and Its Practical Impact on the 
Establishment of Harm to Competition, in The Notion of Restriction of Competition 51 (Damien Gerard et 
al. eds., 2017) (describing two=prong assessment of practices under Articles 101 and 102); Luc Gyselen, 
What Makes an Agreement Anti-competitive: Lessons from the Past, in THE NOTION OF RESTRICTION OF 
COMPETITION 111, 114-21 (Damien Gerard et al. eds., 2017) (examining the “dualist structure of Article 
101). 
151
  [2003] OJ L1/1, Art 2. 
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cases those claiming the benefit of Article 101(3) have the burden of establishing, by means 
of convincing argument and evidence, that all four
 
Article 101(3) criteria are satisfied.
152
 
This structure means that the question of how restrictions of competition are identified at the 
Article 101(1) stage profoundly influences the role and scope of Article 101(3). Similarly the 
existence of Article 101(3) influences the question of what constitutes a restriction of 
competition. Finding the right function to be played by the two parts of Article 101 thus 
provides an important starting point to the development of rules and standards within them. 
The discussion below however, illustrates that this has not proved to be easy and has, rather, 
added to the complexities arising in this area. If, for example, the interpretation of a 
restriction of competition was to become an enquiry into the competitive significance of the 
agreement with categories of antitrust analysis developed within it (as in the US and as some 
EU case-law suggests), the question of what role is to be played by Article 101(3) would 
clearly have to be addressed; the Commission’s view is that this approach is untenable as it 
renders Article 101(3) “otiose”.153  
The Commission’s initial approach, however, was also problematic. The Commission tended, 
arguably motived both by ideology and practicalities,
154
 to interpret the concept of a 
restriction of competition set out in Article 101(1) broadly to encompass many restraints on 
firms’ economic freedom155 and/or ability to engage in cross-border trade, and to rely on 
Article 101(3) as the main vehicle for authorising agreements.
156
 This led to conceptual and 
practical problems that are well-known. At the core, concerns were that the analysis it 
conducted under Article 101(1) was “anaemic”, “unpersuasive”157 and (combined both with 
the difficulty of gaining an individual exemption under the notification and exemption system 
created by Regulation 17 and the rigidity of the early block exemption regulations (BERs)) 
generated legal uncertainty and legal formalisms which risked the condemnation and 
deterrence of innocuous agreements or legitimate business practices (Type 1 errors). The 
methodology also led to different treatment of agreements with similar effect and eliminated 
“what should be the heart of the matter and antitrust (i.e. economics/law) substantive analysis 
of a particular agreement or practice, i.e. its competitive harms and benefits”.158  
                                                 
152
  Case T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline [2006] ECR II-296, para. 235. The requirements are cumulative, see e.g., 
Case C-68/12, Protimonopolný EU:C:2013:71, paras. 31–34. 
153
  For the view that Art. 101(1) could be used for adopting an “economic rule of reason” and Art 101(3) for 
applying a policy rule of reason, see Rein Wesseling, The Commission White Paper on Modernisation of EC 
Antitrust Law: unspoken consequences and incomplete treatment of alternative options (1999) 20 ECLR 
420. 
154
  A broad jurisdictional interpretation of Art.101(1) cemented the Commission’s central role in the moulding 
and shaping of EU competition policy since it had the exclusive right to apply Art. 101(3) through the 
system of notification and exemption, see Reg. 17 [1959–1962] OJ Spec. Ed. 87, Arts. 9(1) and 4. 
155
  See e.g., Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay (eds.), THE EU LAW OF COMPETITION (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 3.160–3.166 and Barry E Hawk, System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law 
[1995] 32 CMLRev 973. 
156
  See, eg Goodyear Italiana-Euram, [1975] OJ L38/10; Campari, [1978] OJ L70/69 para 7, part IIA. 
157
  See Hawk note 155. 
158
  id, 2.5 
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Recognising the need for change, the Commission’s modernization programme159 promised a 
move away from its previous approach to Article 101, to an effects-based one built on a 
consumer welfare foundation and dividing substantive, economic appraisal of agreements 
more equally between the two parts of Article 101. In order to achieve this, the Commission 
pledged more realistic, economic analysis under Article 101(1), introduced more flexible 
BERs and accepted the need for it to give up its monopoly over Article 101(3),
160
 paving the 
way for self-analysis by firms of their agreements and a fuller role to be played by the 
national competition authorities (NCAs) and the national courts in the enforcement process. 
In the Commission’s view the substantive economic analysis to be conducted is to be divided 
between the two distinct parts of Article 101:  
 Article 101(1) is about identifying restrictions on inter- or intrabrand competition 
(assumed in object cases – actual or likely in effect cases) (so moving away from its 
early approach which favoured freedom of individual traders over consumer welfare); 
and  
 Article 101(3) is about identifying procompetitive effects (economic benefits and 
efficiencies) and balancing those within the structure of Article 101(3) against the 
anticompetitive effects identified under Article 101(1) (efficiencies are presumed to 
offset anticompetitive effects in relation to agreements satisfying the conditions of a 
BER).  
This clarifies that there are no absolute rules of per se legality under Article 101 – even in 
cases where anticompetitive effects are assumed – as harmful agreements can always be 
justified at the Article 101(3) stage (but see discussion in Section C below). Further, that the 
Commission’s view is that there should be no consideration of competing anti- and 
procompetitive effects of an agreement at the Article 101(1) stage. Rather, Article 101(1) is 
about identifying “harm” whilst Article 101(3) is for identifying “benefits” and determining 
whether the restraints are indispensable to their achievement and whether a fair share of the 
benefits are passed onto consumers etc.  
It has already been seen that one obstacle to the modernization process is that the 
Commission’s statement on goals has not received unequivocal support from the Court.161 In 
addition, the sections below illustrate that despite the promised reforms, some lack of clarity 
as to exactly how Article 101 analysis is to be conducted persists. First, there is still 
jurisprudence which suggests an interpretation of the concept of a restriction of competition 
within the meaning of Article 101(1) which is not easy to fit within the general structure laid 
out by the Commission above. Not only are there cases which undoubtedly require some of 
assessment of “benefits” to be conducted at the Article 101(1) stage, but others suggest non-
competition factors may still be influencing the interpretation of the concept of a restriction 
of competition and when such restrictions should be assumed. Second, although the 
                                                 
159
  The modernization programme commenced in January 1997, with the adoption by the Commission of a 
Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, COM(96) 721, which included an economic 
analysis of the impact of vertical restraints on competition. Its conclusions, and the debate which followed it, 
led to a new regime for agreements centred around more economic, flexible, overarching block exemptions, 
the publication of guidelines on appraisal of agreements, and the abandonment of the authorization and 
notification system and the removal of the Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction over Article 101(3), see note 
160 and text. 
160
  Regulation 1/2003, [2003] OJ L1/1. 
161
  See notes 142-144 and text. 
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Commission’s exclusive right to adjudicate individually on Article 101(3) has been removed, 
BERs still remain a key feature of the EU system and operate as a “safe harbour” for a swath 
of agreements. Although these exemptions are now more rooted in economics and provide 
helpful legal certainty to firms,
162
 their very existence perpetuates the centrality of Article 
101(3) within the Article 101 system and cloud the relationship between it and Article 
101(1). Finally, as the system continues to rely heavily on presumptions about the impact of 
agreements on competition, relatively few cases are arising before the EU courts which 
require an assessment of whether an agreement has as its effect the restriction of competition 
and how those anticompetitive effects can be balanced against benefits raised under Article 
101(3). The fundamental issue of how the competing competitive harms and benefits of an 
agreement can be assessed under Article 101 has not therefore been developed and clarified. 
C. Rules of illegality?  
i. Restrictions of competition by object 
There are no rules of absolute illegality under Article 101, Article 102 or the EU Merger 
Regulation; all conduct demonstrated to produce restrictive or anticompetitive effects can be 
defended if evidence of offsetting benefits can be demonstrated (in the context of Article 101 
this generally occurs within the structure set out by Article 101(3)
163
). There is, nonetheless, a 
category of conduct (under Articles 101 and 102
164
) which is strongly presumed to infringe 
the rules. In the context of Article 101, this is the case for agreements which are found to 
restrict competition by object. Such agreements are:  
(a) “assumed” to restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) – where the object 
of an agreement “reveals in itself a sufficient degree of harm to competition law”165 no 
assessment of anticompetitive effects is required, or permitted;
166
 and  
(b) according to the Commission, presumed not to satisfy the conditions of Article 101(3). 
The Commission equates object restraints with “hardcore” restraints which preclude the 
safe harbours of the BERs from applying
167
 and make it most unlikely that the agreement 
will individually satisfy the Article 101(3) criteria; it considers agreements of this nature 
(a) generally fail to create objective economic benefits, (b) do not benefit consumers and/ 
or (c) are unlikely to be considered indispensable to the attainment of any efficiencies 
created by the agreement in question (efficiencies generated can generally be achieved by 
less restrictive means).
168
  
                                                 
162
  The BERs are set out in EU regulations which are directly applicable and their benefit can only be 
withdrawn prospectively, see note 216 and text. 
163
  But see notes 233-237 and text and Case C-501/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline note 144. 
164
  Although no mergers are assumed to produce anticompetitive effects, even where market shares or 
concentration ratios are very high (see e.g., Case T-79/12, Sun Chemical Group v. Commission 
EU:T:2013:635) and the wording and structure of Art 102 is very different to Art 101 (it does not refer to 
abuses by object or effect), a “mirror” approach to that adopted under Art 101 is in fact pursued under Art 
102, see e.g., Peeperkorn note 149. 
165
  Case C-67/13P, CB note 141, para. 57 
166
  See eg Case C-286/13 P, Dole Food Co Inc and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v. Commission (Dole) 
EU:C:2015:184, paras. 111–135, Case C-8/08, T-Mobile [2009] ECR I-4529, para 31 and Art 101(3) 
Guidelines, para. 22.  
167
  See Section 4.D. 
168
  See e.g., Art 101(3) Guidelines, paras 46, 79, 105. 
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An argument is often made that object restraints can, and should, be treated in a different way 
to rules of illegality as they are not per se infringements (as in the US); rather, it is possible 
for parties to justify such agreements under Article 101(3). Because there is a stark difference 
between this theory and the practical realities, however, it is submitted that object restraints 
should be approached in a similar way to restraints caught by a per se rule (and for that 
reason we discuss them in this section). First, there is very little existing jurisprudence which 
provides comfort to suggest that the presumption of illegality can ever be overcome, that is as 
to when agreements found to restrict competition by object may satisfy the four onerous 
conditions of Article 101(3) in practice. Further, it seems most unlikely that such guidance 
will emerge in the future.
169
 Second, the pass-on requirement of Article 101(3) essentially 
requires a balancing of anti- and procompetitive effects and it is unclear how parties can 
establish that demonstrated beneficial effects offset anticompetitive effects the nature and 
magnitude of which has not been established under Article 101(1) but only assumed. Third, 
as the chance of benefiting from Article 101(3) is remote and there is a risk of fines or other 
serious consequences if such an agreement is found to be incompatible with Article 101, 
firms generally perceive this conduct to be prohibited or at least extremely risky to pursue. It 
seems crucial therefore that the concept of a restriction of competition by object is 
approached with this reality in mind. If it not confined to agreements which have a high risk 
of harming consumer welfare, there is a clear danger that, as is the case for overinclusive 
rules of per se illegality, procompetitive arrangements will be prohibited and deterred.  
ii. Scope of the By Object Category 
Identifying the object or precise purpose of an agreement 
Case law consistently reiterates that to determine whether an agreement reveals a restrictive 
object or purpose – that is a “sufficiently deleterious impact on competition”170 – “regard 
must be had inter alia to the content of its provisions, the objectives it seeks to ascertain and 
the economic and legal context of which it forms part”.171 Importantly, in Groupement des 
Cartes Bancaires (CB) v Commission
172
 the CJ stressed that, because a finding that an 
agreement restricts competition by object exempts the Commission (or other claimant) from 
its ordinary burden of demonstrating a restriction of competition, the category must be 
interpreted restrictively. It is reserved for agreements which inherently reveal a sufficient 
degree of harm to competition and is inappropriate for other cases where a more detailed 
                                                 
169
  Since the abolition of the notification and exemption system it is rare for competition agencies to conduct 
detailed analysis of when an agreement may satisfy the conditions of Art 101(3). Indeed, most cases pursued 
by the Commission under Art 101 and have been object cases and the Commission has not adopted a final 
decision at all in relation to a vertical agreement since 2005. A flurry of non-infringement decisions 
providing clear guidance on the application of Art 101(3) to agreements incorporating “object” restraints 
seems unlikely.. Not only are NCAs not permitted to adopt non-infringement decisions, (see Case C-375/09, 
Tele2Polska [2011] ECR I-3055) but it seems improbable that the Commission will wish, or be able, to 
dedicate resources to adopting this kind of decision, but see David Bailey, Reinvigorating the Role of Article 
101(3) under Regulation 1/2003 (2016) 81 Antitrust Law Journal 111. In practice, therefore, competition 
agencies may be more likely to deal with object restraints which they consider to be “unproblematic” from a 
competition perspective by deciding not to prioritize it for enforcement. 
170
 Case 56/65, STM [1966] ECR 235, 249. 
171
  Case C-501/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline note 144, para. 58. 
172
 Case C-67/13P, CB note 141. For a discussion of the implications of the decision, see Bernard Amory et al., 
The Object-Effect Dichotomy and the Requirement of Harm to Competition: On the Road to Clarity after 
Cartes-Bancaires?, in THE NOTION OF RESTRICTION OF COMPETITION 65 (Damien Gerard et al. eds., 2017). 
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market analysis is required to assess the impact of the agreement, for example, cases 
involving complex measures, cases where experience
173
 with the restraint is limited or cases 
where there is a plausible efficiency justification for the conduct.
174
 In these latter situations, 
negative effects cannot be considered so likely to make assessment of effects redundant.
175
  
Established restraints liable in principle to restrict competition by object 
Despite the flexible nature of the characterization exercise described above, over the years 
EU case-law has established that certain restraints are liable in principle to restrict 
competition by object. Unsurprisingly, these include cartel agreements
176
 – in particular 
horizontal collusion to fix prices, limit output, share markets or rig bids, to reduce capacity 
(see BIDS
177
), and/or designed, directly or indirectly, to fix purchase or selling prices through 
exchanges of information (see T-Mobile Netherlands BV v Raad van bestuur van de 
Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit).
178
 In CB the CJ explained that as such agreements may 
“be considered so likely to have negative effects, in particular on the price, quantity or quality 
of the goods and services, that it may be considered redundant, for the purposes of applying 
Article [101(1)], to prove that they have actual effects on the market...” (emphasis added).179 
More controversial have been the consistent rulings that certain restraints in vertical 
agreements also constitute, in principle, restrictions by object even though they are not made 
between competitors, but between providers of complementary goods and services, and that 
all such agreements, depending on the environment in which they are concluded, provide 
scope for efficiencies.
180
 These include vertical price fixing (RPM),
181
 restraints conferring 
absolute territorial protection (ATP) on a distributor (or otherwise aimed at partitioning 
national markets or limiting parallel trade),
182
 bans on online selling (which reduces the 
ability of a distributor to sell outside its territory, see Pierre Fabre
183
) and certain selective 
                                                 
173
  The importance of experience was also stressed by the CJ in Case C-286/13 P, Dole note 166, para. 115. See 
also the Opinion of Wathelet AG in Case C-373/14, Toshiba Corp v. Commission EU:C:2015:427. 
174
  See e.g., Case C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax, Servicios de Información sobre Solvencia y Crédito, SL v. 
Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios EU:C:2006:734. 
175
  See also Case C-345/14, SIA “Maxima Latvija” v. Konkurences padome EU:C:2015:784, para 22. 
176
  See e.g. Case C-373/14 P, Toshiba Corp v. Commission EU:C:2016:26, Case C-172/14, ING Pensii v. 
Consiliul Concuretnei EU:C:2015:484 and statement of GC in Cases T-374, 375, 384, and 388/94, European 
Night Services v. Commission [1998] ECR II-3141, para 136. 
177
  Case C-209/07, [2008] ECR I-8637. 
178
  Case C-8/08, note 166, paras 36–43. 
179
  Case C-67/13P, CB note 141, para 51. 
180
  “Most vertical restraints can increase or decrease welfare, depending on the environment. Legality or 
illegality per se thus seems unwarranted”, J. Tirole, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (MIT 
Press, 1988), 186. 
181
 See especially, Case 161/84, Pronuptia de Paris v. Schillgallis [1986] ECR 353, at para. 25 and Case 
243/83, SA Binon & Cie v. SA Agence et Messageries de la Presse [1985] ECR 2015, at para. 44. 
182
  See Cases 56 and 58/64, Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission 
(Consten and Grundig) [1966] ECR 299 and also eg, COMP/28.282, The Distillers Company Ltd [1978] OJ 
L50/16, Case 30/78, Distillers Company v. Commission [1980] ECR 2229, COMP/30.228, Distillers 
Company plc (Red Label) [1983] OJ C245/3; Case T-77/92, Parker Pen v. Commission [1994] ECR II-549. 
183
  Case C-439/09, EU:C:2011:277. 
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distribution systems (SDSs).
184
 In these judgments the Court has not explicitly warned, as it 
did in CB, of a high probability of negative effects on prices etc. They have, however, 
displayed a suspicion of these acute restraints on rivalry between dealers (given the 
“considerable impact of distribution costs on the aggregate cost price”185) and have clearly 
articulated concern about their impact on the single market project, through prohibiting or 
limiting the opportunities for parallel or cross-border trade
186
 and perpetuating price 
differences
187
 between Member States. Indeed, the Commission has stressed that companies 
should not ordinarily be allowed to create barriers to trade between Member States, to seal off 
territories “hermetically . . . , making interpenetration of national markets impossible”188 and 
so contribute to the cost of “not realising” the EU’s single market objectives.189  
In categorizing limitations on intrabrand competition as restrictions of competition 
irrespective of the degree of interbrand competition on the market, the EU approach diverges 
significantly from that adopted by the US Supreme Court in Sylvania and Leegin.
190
 Although 
it could be argued, as the Supreme Court did, that neither theory nor experience justifies an 
assumption of anticompetitive effects in these cases, the entrenched nature of the EU case-
law and the seeming concerns about the internal market underpinning it, make a dramatic 
reversal in this “starting” point seem unlikely. Although there is no formal system of 
precedent in the EU, the CJ strives for consistency,
191
 generally preferring to develop the law 
on an incremental basis rather than through sharp changes in policy.  
The importance of context in identifying the object or purpose of the agreement: 
characterization 
It is important to remember, however, that because of the importance of both content and 
context in identifying the objective of an agreement, the “established” restraints set out above 
do not constitute a definitive list of object restraints. Numerous cases have thus reached the 
EU Courts in recent years on the scope of the object category and expressing concern that EU 
decision-takers have been both (i) too unwilling to accept that the context of a case might 
demonstrate that an agreement incorporating an established restraint does not have a 
                                                 
184
  Id. A SDS restricts the number or type of dealers that the manufacturer will deal with and prohibits sales 
from authorized to non-authorized distributors 
185
  Cases 56 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig note 182, 342-343. 
186
  Case C-501/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline note 144, para. 59. 
187
  The Commission is concerned in particular that RPM is generally liable to restrict competition in a number 
of different ways in particular: through facilitating collusion between suppliers and enhancing price 
transparency; by eliminating intrabrand price competition; by softening competition between suppliers 
and/or retailers; by preventing distributors from lowering sale prices; by lowering pressure on 
manufacturers” margins; by foreclosing competitors; and by reducing dynamism and innovation at the 
distribution level), Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (“Vertical Guidelines”) [2010] OJ C130/10, para 224. 
188
   Ninetendo [2004] OJ L255/33, para. 338 (thereby bringing to nought economic integration). 
189
  Commission, Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, COM(96)721, para. 78 (“The 
elimination of barriers to trade may not achieve its objective if producers and/or distributors introduce 
practices contrary to integration.”) 
190
  See notes 97 and text. 
191
  See e.g., Anthony Arnull, Owning up to Fallibility: Precedent and the Court of Justice (1993) 30 CMLRev 
247. 
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restrictive purpose;
192
 and (ii) too willing to rely on context to expand the category to “new” 
restraints.
193
 In CB,
194
 for example, the CJ had to consider whether the Commission and GC 
had been correct to find that horizontal cooperation, argued to be designed to ensure the 
success of the carte bleu system in particular through combating free-riding and balancing 
issuing/acquisition activities, was restrictive by object.
195
 The CJ considered that, given the 
complex nature of the market and the efficiency justifications raised, negative effects could 
not be considered so likely to make assessment of effects redundant.
196
 Similarly, some cases 
have held that agreements incorporating severe restraints on the core parameters of 
competition will not restrict competition by object (or at all) if designed to achieve a 
legitimate public policy objective or regulatory aim.
197
 
It seems clear, therefore, that horizontal cooperation agreements, with the potential to have 
mixed effects on competition, should not generally fall within the object category even if 
containing established restraints. Indeed, the Commission’s Horizontal Cooperation 
Guidelines
198
 recognise that research and development (R&D), production, and joint 
purchasing agreements which contain price or output restraints will only restrict competition 
by object if they do not truly concern, respectively, joint R&D, production, or joint 
purchasing, but serve as a tool to engage in a disguised cartel.
199
 This approach, focussing on 
experience and context as well as content to characterise an agreement,
200
 bears close 
resemblance to the “ancillary restraints” doctrine utilised by the US courts to distinguish per 
se restraints from restraints that have to be analysed under the rule of reason.
201
  
Case-law makes it clear that a similar exercise is also required in relation to vertical 
agreements. In Murphy,
202
 the CJ accepted that a broadcasting licensing agreement 
                                                 
192
  See e.g., Case C-373/14 P, Toshiba note 176 and Cases C-403 and 429/08, Premier League Ltd v. QC 
Leisure and Murphy v. Media Protection Services Ltd EU:C:2011:631. 
193
  See e.g., Case C-67/13P, CB note 141, and Case C-345/14, Maxima Latvija note 175. 
194
 Case C-67/13P, CB note 141.  
195
  The CJ referred the matter back to the GC which found that the Commission had correctly established that 
the agreement had as its effect the restriction of competition and that the agreement did not satisfy the 
conditions of Art 101(3) – the free-riding arguments had not been substantiated, Case T-491/07, 
EU:T:2016:379.  
196
  See also Case C-345/14, Maxima Latvija note 175, para 22. 
197
 See Case C-309/99, Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten [2002] ECR I-
1577, paras. 106–110 and note 237 and text.  
198
  See Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines [2011] OJ C11/1, paras 128, 160–161, and 205–206, Esteva Mosso, 
note 15 (object restrictions have no equivalent in merger analysis rather each merger is analysed to 
determine its likely impact of the merger on the main market parameters of competition). 
199
 See note 198.  
200
  Such an approach is also in line with that adopted in merger cases. No merger transactions are assumed to 
significantly impede effective competition. Rather, because it is assumed that mergers offer scope for 
efficiencies, a range of relevant factors, not just a contractual clause in isolation, are analysed to determine 
the likely impact of the merger on the main parameters of competition (price, output, quality, innovation, 
etc.).  
201
  Under this approach, the initial inquiry as to whether the restraint is ancillary is distinct from the substantive 
rule of reason analysis conducted; the fact that it is ancillary to legitimate joint activity is not therefore 
enough to establish as a matter of law that the agreement does not unreasonably restrain trade and so falls 
outside Section One, see especially note 81 and text.  
202
  Cases C-403 and 429/08, note 192, para 139 
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containing territorial limitations aimed at partitioning national markets, would not be 
regarded as restrictive by object where other circumstances falling within its economic and 
legal context justified the finding that such an agreement is not liable to impair competition 
and in Pierre Fabre
203
 the CJ held that a selective distribution agreement incorporating a ban, 
or de facto ban, on internet selling necessarily restricted competition (and restricted 
competition by object) unless objectively justified (it constituted a proportionate measure to 
achieve a legitimate aim).  
Although the cases thus demand contextual analysis in the characterization process, a 
difficulty lies in the way that such assessments have been in practice. In many cases parties’ 
arguments relating to experience or context in cases involving established restraints are given 
short shrift. Not only is jurisprudence governing horizontal cooperation agreements and joint 
ventures in this area somewhat unpredictable,
204
 but there is no case involving an ordinary 
vertical agreement (rather than an intellectual property (IP) licensing agreement
205
) in which 
the Commission (or Court) has been prepared to accept, on the facts, that either ATP or RPM 
is not restrictive of competition by object. Rather, as is illustrated by the 1966 case of 
Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission (Consten and 
Grundig),
206
 in these cases the focus tends to be on the restraints imposed and it seems simply 
to be assumed that they are unnecessary or disproportionate to any objective pursued. An 
acute concern therefore is that the object category in the EU is overinclusive.  
“New” object restraints 
Also contentious has been the question of whether, and if so when, new restraints can be 
found to restrict competition by object (for example, multilateral interchange fees (MIFs), 
most favoured nation clauses, patent settlement agreements, and/or no-poach agreements). 
Some judgments of the CJ may have encouraged EU competition agencies to push the 
boundaries of this category,
207
 by utilising over-expansive language suggesting that object 
characterization might be appropriate in relation to new restraints which are likely to,
208
 
capable of having, or have the potential to have, “a negative impact on competition”.209 As 
these statements, taken in isolation, seem to extend the category well beyond agreements 
containing “obvious” restrictions of competition and to blur the line inappropriately between 
object and effects analysis, the CJ’s reminder in CB that the category of object restrictions 
                                                 
203
  Case C-439/09, Pierre Fabre note 183. 
204
  See e.g., cases COMP/29.373, Visa International-Multilateral Interchange Fee [2002] OJ L318/17, 
COMP/34.579, MasterCard [2009] OJ C264/8, COMP/39.398, Visa IP/10/1684 and COMP/39.595, Star 
Alliance: Continental/United/Lufthansa/Air Canada 23 May 2013. 
205
  In Case 262/81, Coditel v. Ciné Vog Films (Coditel II) [1982] ECR 3381 the CJ held that an exclusive 
territorial licence conferring ATP on a broadcaster was not as such restrictive of competition. See also Case 
27/87, Erauw-Jacquéry v. La Hesbignonne [1988] ECR 1919. 
206
 Cases 56 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig note 182. 
207
  See e.g., the Commission’s decision in COMP/39.612, Périndopril (Servier) 9 July 2014, IP14/799, on 
appeal Case T-691/14, Servier SAS v Commission (judgment pending) and the UK (then) OFT’s decision in 
Tobacco 15 April 2010, decision quashed Case Nos 1160–1165/1/1/10 Imperial Tobacco Group plc & Ors v 
OFT [2011] CAT 41. 
208
  Case C-32/11, Allianz Hungária Biztosító Zrt, Generali-Providencia Biztosító Zrt v. Gazdasági 
Versenyhivatal EU:C:2013:160. 
209
  Case C-8/08, T-Mobile note 166, 
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should be interpreted restrictively and confined to agreements which evidently harm the 
proper functioning of competition is to be welcomed.
210
  
D. Rules or Presumptions of Legality?  
It has been seen that providing a rule of legality or a safe harbour can be a useful mechanism 
for immunising, and so encouraging, certain behaviour which is most unlikely to be 
anticompetitive and likely to produce desired benefits. In the EU, the CJ has, for example, 
excluded from Article 101 both agreements designed to improve working conditions (where 
the application of the competition laws would thwart achievement of another Treaty 
objective
211
) and agreements which do not “appreciably” restrict competition. The latter cases 
make it clear that EU law is not concerned with agreements which have an “insignificant 
effect on the market, taking into account the weak position which the persons concerned have 
on the market of the product in question”.212 Although there seems no reason in principle why 
even agreements incorporating object restraint should not fall outside Article 101(1) on de 
minimis grounds, the CJ’s 2011 judgment in Expedia213 is being widely interpreted as 
holding that such agreements always infringe Article 101(1) – they are simply assumed to 
restrict competition appreciably.
 214
 
The EU system also utilises BERs, for example, for research and development, specialisation, 
vertical and technology transfer agreements, as central mechanisms for “exempting” 
categories of agreements from Article 101(1). Most BERs since modernization
215
 apply only 
if specified conditions are met: in particular, that market share thresholds (used as rough 
proxies for market power) are not exceeded and “hard-core” restraints are not incorporated 
within the agreements. As the benefit of these regulations, which are directly applicable, can 
only be withdrawn prospectively,
216
 they provide comfort to firms that agreements satisfying 
their conditions are compatible with Article 101 on the grounds that that the efficiencies 
resulting from the agreement are presumed to offset any anticompetitive effects. The ability 
to withdraw the BERs means, however, that Article 101 can be applied in the future to 
agreements which are proved to infringe Article 101.  
                                                 
210
  In Case T-472/13, Lundbeck v. Commission EU:T:2016:449 the GC concluded that the Commission had 
rightly concluded that patent settlements involving reverse payment were akin to market exclusion 
agreements liable to have negative effects on competition, so it was unnecessary to demonstrate that they 
had such effects for the purpose of Art 101(1). 
211
  Case C-67/96, Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] ECR I-
5751 it excluded entirely from the scope of Art 101 collective agreements between workers and employers 
intended to improve working conditions (the Treaty objective of achieving a high level of employment and 
social protection would be thwarted if Art 101 applied to them). Agreements concluded by firms carrying 
out tasks of a public or social nature also fall outside of Art 101. See also the agricultural exemption, Reg. 
1184/2006 [2006] OJ L214/7 and Reg. 1308/2013 [2013] OJ L347/671. 
212
  Case 5/69, Völk v. Vervaecke [1969] ECR 295, 302 
213
  See Case C-226/11, Expedia Inc v. Authorité de la concurrence EU:C:2012:795 and De minimis notice, id. 
214
  Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 
101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice), C(2014) 4136 final 
215
  See note 159 and text. 
216
  Reg 1/2003 [2003] OJ L1/1, Arts 29(1)(2) and e.g., Reg. 330/2010 [2010] OJ L, recital 15 (see also Art. 6). 
Where the BER appears to exempt an agreement which is problematic, the Commission or NCA have to 
withdraw its benefit from the agreement which is valid and compatible until then (consequently no 
infringement decision of fine for breach is possible). 
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It has been mentioned already that one problem with the BERs is that even though (i) in line 
with a consumer welfare objective, they are less rigid and formalistic than their predecessors, 
and (ii) they provide valuable legal certainty, they do create some conceptual difficulties 
within the Article 101 analytical framework. One issue is that they focus analysis on Article 
101(3) rather than Article 101(1). For example, the Commission’s Vertical Guidelines 
acknowledge that for “most vertical restraints, competition concerns can only arise if there is 
insufficient competition at one or more levels of trade, i.e. if there is some degree of market 
power at the level of the supplier or the buyer or at both levels”.217 Further, that even 
agreements between parties whose market shares exceed the 30 per cent market share 
threshold set out in the BER for vertical agreements, Regulation 330/2010,
218
 may not 
infringe Article 101(1). The Guidelines offer no explanation, however, as to why such a 
broad overarching block exemption is necessary at all for agreements concluded between 
parties which lack market power and which do not contain hard-core restraints (most or many 
of which seem unlikely to infringe Article 101(1)). Secondly, their refusal to accept that 
agreements incorporating hard-core restraints may be block exempted means that the 
economic logic underpinning them has not been pushed as far as some might like. 
E. Developing Standards: Individual “Effects” Analysis under Article 101(1) and 
Article 101(3) 
i. Overview 
Because of the substantial reliance on both the category of object restraints (by the 
Commission, and NCAs, in their infringement decisions) and the de minimis principle and 
BERs (by firms), the question of how antitrust analysis is conducted in other scenarios arises 
relatively rarely before the EU courts and so is comparatively unexplored. There is therefore 
no steady flow of cases emerging before the EU courts which allows them to develop and 
hone the case-law in this area. The cases that do exist arise either result from: (a) an Article 
267 reference made by a national court (in these cases the CJ is asked to advise only on the 
interpretation of Article 101 leaving the national court to apply that interpretation to the facts 
of the case in front of it); or (b) a request to review a Commission decision taken under 
Article 101(1) and (3) (since the abolition of the notification and authorisation system set up 
by Regulation 17 fewer of these cases are arising as Article 101 “effect” cases examined by 
the Commission tend to be resolved through commitments, rather than final, decisions
219
). 
The sections below examine the existing case-law and considers how it guides detailed 
appraisal of agreements under Article 101. 
ii. Article 101(1) – identifying agreements with restrictive effects 
The case-law sets out some important starting principles relevant for analysing restrictive 
effects under Article 101(1). For example, it clarifies that: Article 101 is concerned both with 
restrictions of competition between the parties and between a party/ and third parties;
220
 it is 
necessary to examine an agreement in its market context to determine its effects (whether 
                                                 
217
  Vertical Guidelines, para. 6. 
218
  [2010] OJ L102/1. 
219
  See e.g., COMP/39.595, Star Alliance note 204. 
220
  Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig note 182. 
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alone or in combination with other agreements);
221
 the analysis should be conducted in the 
light of the competition which would occur if the agreement in question had not been 
made;
222
 and even where an assessment is being made ex post, demonstration of actual or 
likely
223
 effects is sufficient. The cases thus confirm that “not every agreement … which 
restricts the freedom of action of the parties or one of them necessarily falls within the 
prohibition”;224 account has to be taken of the actual condition, and economic context, in 
which the agreement functions.
225
  
Some judgments of the EU courts, for example, the CJ’s judgment in Delimitis,226 support the 
view that the Article 101(1) inquiry must focus on the important question whether or not the 
agreement, alone or in conjunction with a network of similar agreements, would be likely to 
have an appreciable impact on the parameters of competition (such as price, quantity or 
quality)
227
 and allow the parties to exercise market power – in that case through a restriction 
of interbrand competition. In Delimitis the Court set out guidance for a national court as to 
how to assess the compatibility with Article 101(1) of a beer supply agreement obliging a 
café proprietor to purchase most of its beer requirements from the brewer. In so doing, it 
stressed the importance of assessing whether the agreement appreciably contributed to a 
foreclosure of access to the market. This required the relevant market to be defined and an 
assessment made of whether there was a concrete possibility for new competitors to penetrate 
the market or existing competitors to expand. Similarly, in O2 (Germany) GmbH & Co OHG 
v Commission
228
 the GC stressed, in the context of horizontal cooperation, that the Article 
101 analysis consists essentially in taking account of the impact of the agreement on existing 
or potential competition and the competitive situation in the absence of the agreement. 
Further, in European Night Services
229
 the GC referred to the need to take account of the 
economic context in which the undertakings operate, the products or services covered by the 
agreement, the actual structure of the market concerned and the conditions of competition, 
including existing and potential competition, to determine whether there were real concrete 
possibilities for the undertakings concerned to compete among themselves or for a new 
competitor to penetrate the relevant market and compete with established undertakings.  
Not all of the Article 101case-law is, however, easy to fit within the (economic) structure 
envisaged by the Commission. Rather, some cases have rejected the need for a necessary link 
                                                 
221
  Case 56/65, STM note 170. Case C-382/12 P. MasterCard and Others v. Commission EU:C:2014:2201, para 
165 (“when appraising the effects of coordination between undertakings in the light of Article [101], it is 
necessary to take into consideration the actual context in which the relevant coordination arrangements are 
situated, in particular the economic and legal context in which the undertakings concerned operate, the 
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   Case 56/65 id. 
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on competition”, Case C-345/14, Maxima Latvija note 175, para 30. 
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  Case C-309/99, Wouters note 197, para 97. 
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  Case T-112/99, Métropole Télévision SA (M6) v. Commission [2001] ECR II-2459. 
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  Case C-234/89, Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu [1991] ECR I-935. 
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  See e.g., Case C-382/12 P. MasterCard note 221, para 93. 
228
  Case T-328/03, [2006] ECR II-1231, para. 71. 
229
 Cases T-374, 375, and 388/94 note 176, para. 136. 
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with consumer harm when identifying a restriction of competition, demanding only harm to 
competition or the competitive structure
230
 and some, as is seen below, suggest that “public 
policy” factors are relevant in assessing both whether there is a restriction of competition 
within the meaning of Article 101(1)
231
 and whether it produces benefits at the Article 101(3) 
stage.
232
  
Further, in a line of cases frequently referred to in the EU as “ancillary restraints cases” the 
EU Courts, as explained in Remia & Nutricia,
233
 consider what the state of competition 
would be if certain allegedly restrictive clauses did not exist. If it is found that individual 
restraints contained in a non-restrictive transaction are objectively necessary for, directly 
related and proportionate to it – i.e. without it the transaction (in that case the sale of a 
business together with its goodwill) would be unlikely to be implemented or proceed – it 
holds that they “are free of the prohibition of Article 101(1)”.234 In these cases, the restraints, 
even if they do restrict competition, fall outside Article 101(1) as, without them, the 
beneficial transaction would not take place. If the clauses are not found to be ancillary, 
however, it seems that they are not prohibited automatically but only if established to restrict 
competition – whether by object or effect235 (see also Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v Pronuptia 
de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis
236
 where the CJ made it clear that restraints in the franchising 
agreement which were not considered to be ancillary to it had to be scrutinised to see if they 
restricted competition).  
In an analogous way, the CJ has also held that a “restraint” in an agreement will not infringe 
Article 101(1) if it could reasonably be considered necessary to ensure a public policy 
objective, such as the proper practice of the legal profession.
237
 Similarly, in a line of cases 
dealing with vertical and IP licensing agreements the Court has tended to assume that 
“restraints” on distributors/licensees competing with each other238 (restraints on intrabrand 
competition) are restrictive of competition
239
 unless necessary to achieve some identified, 
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  But see notes 141-144 and text. 
231
  See note 197 and text.  
232
  See note 252 and text.  
233
  Case 42/84 [1985] ECR 2545. The doctrine as envisaged by Remia thus seems to have two distinct parts: the 
non-compete clauses or other restrictions must be objectively linked to the main transaction so that they are 
assessed together; and the main transaction must be compatible with Art 101. 
234
  In Remia ibid it was held that a non-competition clause, reasonably limited in time and scope, would be 
ancillary to the sale of the business as without it the vendor could win back the custom from the purchaser. 
Such clauses could, therefore, enhance competition by increasing the number of undertakings on the relevant 
market. This will, however, exclude only certain clauses from Art 101(1). See also Art 101(3) Guidelines, 
para. 28 (“If … it is concluded that the main transaction covered by the agreement is not restrictive of 
competition, it becomes relevant to examine whether individual restraints contained in the agreement are 
also compatible with Article [101(1)] because they are ancillary to the main non-restrictive transaction”). 
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 Case C-382/12 P. MasterCard note 221. 
236
  Case 161/84, [1986] ECR 353. 
237
  In e.g., Case C-309/99, Wouters note 197, the CJ clarified that there would be no infringement of Art 101(1) 
where a restrictive provision with an adverse effect on competition could be considered necessary to ensure 
that consumers and the sound administration of justice were provided with necessary guarantees in relation 
to integrity and experience. 
238
 It has been seen that in these cases the EU courts have been inherently suspicious of restraints on rivalry 
between dealers 
239
  See Cases 56 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig note 182 and Case C-439/09, Pierre Fabre note 183. 
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legitimate purpose.
240
 These restraints are thus held to be restrictive of competition unless it 
is shown that they are necessary for example: to facilitate the penetration of a new market by 
an undertaking through the prevention of free riding on a dealer’s marketing and promotion 
efforts (see, for example, Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (STM));
241
 
to encourage investment by a licensee;
242
 or to encourage non-price competition between 
dealers in a SDS (see, for example, Metro-SB-Grossmärkte GmbH v Commission (Metro 
1)
243
).
244
  
These strands of cases, developed from early jurisprudence (and before modernization), 
display slightly different nuances, without fully clarifying their relationship with each other 
and/or their implications for Article 101(1) and Article 101(3) analysis more generally. It is 
clear, nonetheless, that each involve both some form of characterization exercise and some 
form of truncated analysis and burden shifting in the identification of restrictions of 
competition. The ancillary restraint cases assess first whether the restraints seem necessary to 
the legitimate agreement/ objective – if this seems plausible they are not considered to be 
restrictive of competition by object. Second, the restraints are tested to see if they are 
ancillary. If they are necessary, they fall outside of Article 101(1) altogether – it seems to be 
assumed that the legitimate objective pursued outweighs any restrictions which flow from the 
restraints identified. Thirdly, if they are not ancillary, a fuller analysis of the agreement’s 
restrictive effects (under Article 101(1)) and countervailing benefits (under Article 101(3)) is 
required. In objective necessity cases, in contrast, the objective necessity function seems to 
perform only a combined classification and truncated analysis function. If the restraints are 
not objectively necessary they are assumed to restrict competition (they are restrictive of 
competition by object). If they are objectively necessary however they do not restrict 
competition (by object or effect).  
The analysis conducted in these cases does not therefore demand an assessment of the 
agreement’s actual or likely effects on competition and the extent to which a negative effect 
on prices, output, innovation, or the variety or quality of goods and services can be expected 
nor a detailed examination of the offsetting efficiencies/ benefits. Further, although in some 
cases the EU courts have gone out of their way to stress that that they do no conduct a US-
style rule of reason, the appraisal conducted in each does involve some loose form of 
balancing or consideration of the agreements benefits raised by the defendant against harms 
at the Article 101(1) stage, the very analysis that the Commission states is reserved for 
Article 101(3). Indeed, in some cases the balancing conducted under Article 101(1) is closely 
in line with the type done in free movement cases using the “EU rule of reason”.245 Finally, 
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  See Cases C-403 and 429/08, Murphy note 192. 
241
 Case 56/65, STM note 170. 
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  Case 26/76, [1977] ECR 1875, para. 21 and see Art 101(3) Guidelines, para 24. 
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competition by object. The Guidelines do accept, however, that in exceptional circumstances RPM might 
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the cases do not provide clear guidance as to how it can be determined whether a restraint is 
objectively necessary or directly related, necessary and proportionate to an agreement or what 
the counterfactual is.
246
 Rather the jurisprudence itself accepts that this constitutes a rather 
“abstract” exercise, and the thresholds set are high. 
iii. Article 101(3) 
Although modern guidance on how Article 101(3)’s elements are to be interpreted is sparse, 
it is clear that the burden is on the parties to show that it is more likely than not that all four 
of its (cumulative and onerous) conditions are satisfied
247
 and that any agreement may in 
principle satisfy the criteria.
248
 Further, that benefits resulting from Article 101(3) must result 
not just to the parties (in their production and distribution activities) but must create 
appreciable objective advantages to compensate consumers for the disadvantages which they 
cause in the field of competition.
249
 It is, however, the beneficial effect on all consumers in 
the relevant markets that is relevant, not the effect on each member of the category.
250
 
One controversy is whether Article 101(3) only allows for efficiency justifications to be 
raised. Although some early jurisprudence indicates that other non-competition factors are 
cognizable under Article 101(3),
251
 one view is that even if this position may have been 
supportable in a system where Article 101(3) decisions were made by a sole-decision taker 
(pre-2004, the Commission), it is not appropriate that, in the current decentralised 
enforcement systems, NCAs and national courts should also be able to conduct this type of 
balancing exercise between competition and non-competition factors. The Commission thus 
states in its Guidance that public policy factors are relevant only if they can be used to 
supplement the economic benefits which the agreement generates. This point has, however, 
yet to be explicitly addressed by the EU Courts.
252
  
A particularly difficult hurdle for those relying on Article 101(3) to overcome is the 
“indispensability” criterion. In contrast to the ancillary restraints doctrine, this is stated to 
require not a showing that the agreement would not be concluded in the absence of the 
restrictions but that the restrictions are indispensable to the achievement of the benefits, while 
allowing consumers a fair share of them.
253
 Restrictions are not indispensable, therefore, if 
                                                                                                                                                        
measure (i) is justified either on the basis of one Treaty-based exceptions or the Court-recognised 
justifications—the overriding requirements of public interest (the EU rule of reason) and (ii) proportionate. 
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efficiencies can be achieved by other practicable or less restrictive means
254
 or if they are not 
reasonably necessary to produce the efficiencies. This criterion seems to incorporate a 
“sliding scale”,255 meaning that it harder for more severe restraints (especially by object 
ones
256
) to satisfy it.  
F. Summary and the Impact of the Enforcement System 
The EU enforcement structure has had a significant, and enduring, influence on the 
substantive interpretation of Article 101’s provisions. The initial centralised system in which 
the Commission had the exclusive right to apply Article 101(3) individually to agreements 
created a temptation for the Commission to apply Article 101(1) formalistically and place 
emphasis on Article 101(3) as the main vehicle for authorising agreements. As, pre-2004, 
obtaining an Article 101(3) exemption was not easy in practice, the ancillary restraints and 
objective necessity doctrines (along with development of the de minimis principle and the 
adoption of BERs) provided mechanisms for ensuring some restraints on freedom of action 
could escape from the Article 101(1) prohibition. Although the modernization process 
promised a decentralised enforcement system and more realistic assessment of agreements 
under Article 101(1), it has been seen that there is still emphasis on object restraints in the 
cases, the jurisprudence on how “effects” analysis is to be conducted under Article 101(1) (or 
efficiencies assessed under Article 101(3)) has not evolved significantly and BERs continue 
to play a central role in the system. These products of the old system have endured but are 
difficult to rationalise within the modernized framework creating overlaps with, and 
confusion as to, the analysis to be conducted under Article 101(1) and Article 101(3) – in 
particular how exactly ancillary restraints and objective necessity inquiries under Article 
101(1) differ from examination of indispensability within the forum of Article 101(3).  
The decentralised enforcement system, together with the Commission’s policy of imposing 
significant fines on undertakings that have committed serious infringements, may also be 
factors which encourage reliance on brighter line rules which promote certainty and 
consistency in decision-taking. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper recognises that the contours of an antitrust analytical framework must be moulded 
to fit each individual competition regime taking account of range of factors, including the 
objectives and make up of its rules, the maturity of the regime and way in which it is 
enforced. Nonetheless, this paper finds support for a number of broad propositions:  
 The legal system cannot always replicate the principles underpinning it meaning that legal 
commands may create risks of Type 1 or Type 2 errors;  
 The modern progression in antitrust analysis is – for agreements, single-firm conduct and 
mergers – from categories to concepts, with the use of presumptions and burden shifting 
to organize the application of the concepts;  
 Carefully confined rules, or strong presumptions, of illegality and legality may be 
desirable to deter manifestly anticompetitive conduct and to promote or encourage 
procompetitive behaviour respectively. However, excessive use of bright line rules to 
condemn risks Type I errors and invites equilibration to evade them;  
                                                 
254
  Case C-68/12, Protimonopolný note 152. 
255
  Faull & Nikpay note 155 3.494. 
256
  See note 168 and text. 
44 
 
 The need for clear rules in criminal enforcement, cases resulting in civil penalties/fines or 
decentralised enforcement systems may require certain agreements to be dealt with 
through a dichotomy model rather than a continuum model;  
 Characterization mechanisms are required to minimise Type 1 errors and distortions 
flowing from the application of (otherwise) overinclusive rules or presumptions of 
illegality (systems must provide flexibility to assess efficiency claims at the preliminary 
stage of analysis in all cases);  
 Various strands of analysis dealing with ancillary restraints, less restrictive alternatives 
and balancing of competitive harms and benefit in the US and EU require integration 
within a coherent framework;  
 If meritorious antitrust actions are not to be deterred, courts and agencies must endeavour 
to provide structured and clear guidance as to how competitive harms and benefits can be 
weighed or balanced against each other in cases where detailed analysis of the effects of 
an agreements is required; and  
 Administrative adjudication may provide an effective device for elaboration of doctrine.  
In recent years extensive debate has considered whether and if so how to ensure substantive 
convergence between US and EU antitrust law, in particular in relation to mergers and single-
firm conduct. Although relatively little attention has focussed on agreements the discussion in 
this paper illustrates that there is still significant divergence between the US and EU systems 
in this area.  
In the US there has, in the last forty years, been a distinct shift away from a dichotomous 
approach to antitrust analysis of agreements towards one based on a continuum. Although 
criminal enforcement has supported retention of a per se rule in relation to a narrow category 
of horizontal cartel cases, in every case a classification process provides the defendants with 
the opportunity to raise an “efficiency” story for its agreement before it can be condemned as 
illegal per se. Agreements with a plausible efficiency rationale are analysed under the rule of 
reason, although not every case is a candidate for plenary analysis. Rather truncated analysis, 
involving burden shifting between the parties, may be carried out in some situations. It is in 
the area of rule of reason where greater elaboration of policy is required and where there is a 
need for greater clarification on the questions of which party bears the burden of proof or 
production and when and how it can be determined whether less restrictive means of 
achieving a procompetitive objective exist and/or whether anticompetitive effects outweigh 
the procompetitive effects of the agreement (or vice versa). For all of the effort that the courts 
have taken to clarify the rule of reason and its application to restrictive agreements, 
considerable room remains to integrate various strands of analysis (including ancillary 
restraints doctrine) into a single, coherent framework 
Experience also has focused attention on the institutional arrangements for refining doctrine. 
In a number of cases, the FTC’s administrative adjudication mechanism has supplied the 
catalyst for improvements in the rule of reason framework. The contributions of cases such as 
IFD and Polygram suggest the value of FTC’s administrative process as means for continued 
doctrinal clarification and elaboration. This will not likely happen by accident, and further 
progress will require conscious efforts by the FTC, in cooperation with the Justice 
Department, to map out the contours of existing jurisprudence and to identify how best to use 
the FTC’s unique capabilities in this regard.  
In the EU, although there has recently been a greater acceptance that Article 101, Article 102 
and merger analysis should converge around a single analytical framework based on uniform 
concepts, it has been seen that the system governing agreement in fact continues to rely much 
more heavily on presumptions of both illegality and legality than in the US and in the EU’s 
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own dominance and merger frameworks. In consequence, few agreement cases exist in which 
a balancing of actual or likely restrictions on parameters of competition against efficiencies is 
actually required.  
This paper proposes that EU decision-takers should become more willing to analyse whether 
theory, experience and especially context justifies a finding that an agreement is restrictive by 
object.
257
 Up until now, they have been more disposed to have regard to experience and 
context as a mechanism for expanding the by object category than as a means of narrowing it. 
To ensure that the object category is not overinclusive, it is essential that it be confined to 
agreements demonstrating a high likelihood of anticompetitive effects (capability, potential 
or likelihood of anticompetitive is insufficient) and that it should not be applied in cases 
where the restraint on competition is not obvious.  
If the breadth of the object category is more realistically limited, a claimant will more 
frequently be required to demonstrate restrictive effects (actual or likely) before the parties 
can be required to provide a robust justification of the efficiencies within the Article 101(3) 
forum.
258
 The EU administrative framework provides a flexible forum for the competing 
effects of agreements to be scrutinised and balanced. If the Commission were to bring more 
effect cases, resources could be concentrated on developing the Article 101 framework 
(rather than the limits of the by object category) and clarifying important issues such as the 
role of the EU ancillary restraints and objective necessity principles. Although these doctrines 
may have made sense in the pre-modernized era (and when getting an Article 101(3) 
exemption for an agreement was frequently impractical) and make sense as characterization 
mechanisms, they are harder to rationalise within a modernized framework which requires 
economic analysis at both the Article 101(1) and Article 101(3) stage of the assessment. Not 
only do the cases seem to miss some important steps in competition analysis but they appear 
to demand inquiries under Article 101(1) which duplicate or overlap with analysis required in 
the process of applying Article 101(3).  
As suggested above, we see a larger purpose for courts and antitrust enforcement agencies in 
the EU and the US to focus additional attention upon the framework for assessing restrictive 
agreements. Intense discussions about disparities in how the two jurisdictions treat unilateral 
conduct seem to eclipse important differences in the evolution of the essential tools for 
assessing concerted action. Mutual reflection on the different evolutionary paths could 
deepen understanding about possible doctrinal options and inform improvements in both 
regimes. This also could be the occasion for a broader examination of how experience across 
all of the shared areas of competition law – agreements, dominant firm conduct, and mergers 
– could guide the establishment of a unified analytical framework that ensures that the 
assessment of all forms of antitrust-relevant conduct is liberated from the need to place 
behaviour in certain historical categories and instead concentrates upon core concepts 
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involving the presence of actual or likely anticompetitive effects and the existence of valid 
business justifications.
259
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